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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of a financial accelerator mechanism for housing in
the context of a small open economy. Following the seminal financial accelerator
framework in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model set out by
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG), Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2002,
2002a, 2004) (APV) examine the role of the financial accelerator for the housing
market. In my basic model (Chapter 2), I extend the analysis of APV from a closed
economy to a small open economy in which imports are used as intermediate inputs
into the production process and foreign demand for domestically produced goods is
influenced by the real exchange rate. Unlike APV, I set the endowment of housing
to be consistent with the nature of consumer behaviour, in that “rule of thumb”
(ROT) consumers (who do not save) are renters, further differentiating them from
“permanent income hypothesis” (PIH) consumers.
I find that in contrast to APV, the financial accelerator effect does not increase
the responsiveness of consumption and output to various shocks. This is due in
part to the endowment of housing being restricted to PIH households. I find that
the presence of a financial accelerator increases the responsiveness of the housing
market to nominal interest rate, technology, and foreign shocks.
Moreover, even though the financial accelerator reduces the reaction of the non-
housing variables to shocks, there is still a positive correlation between house prices
and consumption, consistent with the widely observed empirical relationship be-
tween the two. Furthermore, given that PIH households have access to the capital
markets, the model does not rely on a wealth effect to generate this correlation even
though homeowners can engage in housing equity withdrawal.
In Chapter 3 I extend the DSGE model to include a more fully specified fiscal
sector. I find that consistent with the RBC view of fiscal policy, a positive govern-
ment spending shock has a negative impact on the housing market. Using the type
of fiscal rule proposed by Gal´ı, Valle´s and Lo´pez-Salido (2004), I find that govern-
ment spending crowds out private consumption, including the purchase of housing
services and has a negative impact on house prices. Despite the positive short-term
impact on output, tax increases that would ultimately fund the spending shock act
as a drag on consumption.
ii
In Chapter 4 I examine the New Zealand empirical data in order to see whether
a financial accelerator effect can be detected. Using a small seven variable Struc-
tural Vector Auto-Regression model I find that shocks to house prices do not have a
significant impact on the mortgage rate-benchmark interest rate spread in the man-
ner suggested by the financial accelerator model. This may be due to other costs
(such as funding mortgage lending through the international swap market by New
Zealand banks) having a significant impact on the setting of mortgage rates and
thus the spread. I also find that government spending does not appear to have a
significant impact on house prices and the median response is mildly negative - con-
sistent with the result from the DSGE model. Nevertheless, the SVAR does detect
a significant relationship between shocks to house prices and household consumption.
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Chapter 1
Housing and consumption - an
overview and introduction of the
financial accelerator
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the financial accelerator with
regard to the housing market, in the context of a small open economy. Given that
the financial accelerator forms part of the wider housing-consumption relationship,
it is useful to provide some context and sketch out the housing and consumption
literature as a background. In this chapter, I set out an overview of this research
before discussing the specific role of the financial accelerator.
Housing has been an increasingly important element of New Zealand household
balance sheets and wealth. As a proportion of total assets, housing accounted for
65% in 1990, growing to around 74% in 2010. Although less consistent in terms of
an upward trend, net housing worth (value of housing stock less household debt)
as a proportion of net wealth rose from 60% to 68% over the same time frame.1
Clearly then, despite the financial deregulation since the 1980’s and the relatively
light regulation of the finance sector, housing’s dominance of non-human wealth has
grown.
Given this heavy weighting of housing in household wealth, it is natural to look
at the extent to which it affects consumption spending by households. Although
there has been a rapid growth in studies of the role of housing in the macroecon-
1RBNZ Household Assets and Liabilities data, 2010
1
omy, there is still debate over the the theoretical underpinning. Empirically, there
appears to be a strong correlation between real house prices and consumption (see
Figure 1.3) but the econometric studies to date have provided mixed results as to
the fundamental nature of the relationship.
Figure 1.1: New Zealand house prices and household consumption
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Figure 1.2: Levels data
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Figure 1.3: HP filtered data
Indeed, early studies of housing wealth did not set out a clear theoretical under-
pinning. Typical of this approach is Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) in which con-
sumption is regressed against both stock market and housing wealth and a marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth estimated. Implicit in this approach is
the assumption that homeowners view changes in housing wealth as permanent and
as a result spend more, either by running down non-housing savings or by reduc-
ing the equity they hold in their homes (mortgage or housing equity withdrawal).
This approach to estimating the effect of housing wealth is still common (see, for
example, Fisher, Otto and Voss, 2010). In New Zealand, De Veirman and Dunstan
(2008) follow a similar approach and find a signficant relationship between housing
wealth and consumption. Smith (2010) also adopts this approach but examines in
more detail other factors such as demographics and ownership status and finds a
significant relationship between house prices and expenditure.
However, the simple assertion that a change to the value of houses is a change
in wealth ignores the stream of housing services that stem from home ownership.
A rise in house prices necessarily implies an increase in the imputed value of rental
to be consumed over time by homeowners. Buiter (2010) sets out the argument
2
that house price changes result in a wealth re-distribution from those “short” hous-
ing (such as tenants and potential first-home buyers) to those “long” housing (e.g.
homeowners looking to downsize to smaller houses or to rent). Homeowners in the
middle who own a house and do not intend changing their housing status are left
unaffected. Over the course of the last three census, New Zealanders have become
more mobile with the median number of years at their current address falling from
5.2 years in 1996 to 3.7 years in 2006. Admittedly these figures include renters but
given that over half of New Zealand households do own their own house, this reduc-
tion likely reflects an increase in turnover in the owner-occupier part of the housing
stock. While this might suggest that households do look to realise the gains made
in house values, for every seller there is a buyer who must pay a higher price.
Of course, factors such as demographics and the regulatory environment may impact
on the housing market.2 For example, economies where the birth rate is above or
below 2 will experience a changing demand for housing services and would thus likely
see changes to house prices over time. Buiter (2010) also points to the potential for
bubbles to affect house prices and expenditure behaviour. This, however, requires a
degree of myopia on the part of house buyers (or arguably a degree of irrationality)
in that bubbles by definition are not justified by exogenous factors (such as changing
demographics or regulation) and thus should not be seen as permanent.
One possible explanation for why a “pure” wealth effect exists in aggregate is that a
significiant proportion of houseowners do not value the imputed rental in the same
way as expected by Buiter. Shafer and Thaler (2006) note that where consumption
purchases have an investment element, there is a tendency for consumers to discount
the eventual consumption by too much. Given that housing can be characterised
as an investment that yields housing services over time, it thus may be that house-
owners undervalue the stream of housing services as they are being consumed and
thus do not equate estimates of the current market value with the present value
of the services they receive. If homeowners heavily discount the value of housing
services, the result is an excess of the current house value over the present value of
the imputed rental and a perception that their wealth has increased.3
2See Grimes and Aitken (2006) for an example of how regulatory differences may impact on
house prices in New Zealand and Stillman and Mare´ (2008) for an examination of the effect of
migration on New Zealand house prices.
3Behavioural economics may also help explain this through the impact of anchoring. Although
interest rates on mortgages vary, the principal on which mortgage payments are set is determined
3
Proponents of a wealth effect have more recently turned from explaining the cor-
relation by a pure wealth effect to one of credit constraints. There is a similarity
between borrowing to fund margin trading of financial assets and the use of a down-
payment and mortgage to purchase a house as any subsequent change to the value
of the property accrues to the homeowner and not the mortgagor. Homeowners
that refinance their mortgage in a rising property market are able to increase the
amount borrowed against their house due to the effective increase in the equity stake.
Liu, Wang and Zha (2010) set out a closed economy DSGE model where credit
constraints amplify macroeconomic fluctuations via house prices. Aron, Duca, Muel-
bauer, Murata and Murphy (2010) point to research that suggests credit liberalisa-
tion has had a significant impact on homeowners’ ability to access housing wealth
and explicitly incorporate a credit conditions index into their regressions of con-
sumption on various forms of wealth. There are two issues with relying on such
a mechanism as the explanation for the housing wealth-consumption relationship.
First, the nature of the typical mortgage contract is one-sided in that while the
homeowner may be able to increase borrowing as values rise, banks are not able
to decrease the amount of debt during periods of market decline.4 Thus loosen-
ing credit constraints may occur during periods of positive house price growth but
would be less obvious during price declines. Second, such an explanation does not sit
well with the observation that New Zealand homeowners tended to pay down their
mortgage debt. Figure 1.4 shows that New Zealand housing equity injection, as
measured by the RBNZ, was broadly positive up until 2003 at which point it turned
negative but then went sharply positive in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis.
In addition to the inconsistency of rising injections up until 2002 with a housing
market that underwent a major upswing over the 1993-1998 period, the relatively
flat period of house prices and consumption between 2004 and 2006 coincides with
a period of significant equity withdrawal. Thus the idea that rising housing wealth
relaxes credit constraints and thence facilitates higher consumption does not appear
by the initial purchase price, regardless of what happens to the current market value. This may
reinforce in the minds of houseowners with mortgages that the price they pay on a monthly basis
(their mortgage payment) is equal to the imputed rent and is unrelated to the current value of the
house.
4Although it may take several years before repricing of mortgages occurs, the underlying ex-
tension of credit may have a term of decades. While banks may add a premium if the loan to
value ratio increases, it would be difficult for them to require accelerated repayment of part of the
principle.
4
to be borne out by the agggregate data.
Figure 1.4: New Zealand housing equity injection (negative indicates withdrawal of
funds from housing stock)
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Household financial liabilities (which in New Zealand are largely driven by residen-
tial mortgage debt) rose over the period 1990-2000 (see Figure 1.5). However, I note
that there were two bouts of real house price deflation that overlapped with this
rise in household liabilities (1990-1992 and 1998-2001, see Figure 1.2). If there is
a causal relationship running from house price movements to credit constraints (in
terms of the extent to which they are binding), one would expect to see a flattening
of the household claims to housing value ratio during the periods of house price
retracement.
This does not completely rule out relaxed credit criteria. It is quite possible that
competition between mortgage providers (be they banks or non-bank lending insti-
tutions such as building societies or finance companies) led to an erosion of credit
criteria over time. While an increased demand for mortgages may have drawn lenders
into the mortgage market, this is not the same as a credit collateral effect. Another
way to look at this is to note that relaxed credit criteria may have allowed for greater
borrowing even if house prices had remained unchanged.
5
Figure 1.5: New Zealand household claims to dwelling values: household indebted-
ness as a proportion of housing assets
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Furthermore, Attanasio, Leicester and Wakefield (2010) provide a lifecycle model
incorporating credit constraints that suggests a pure wealth effect would be more
apparent among older households. This is consistent with Buiter’s view that older
households would benefit from a redistribution. Attanasio et al. use UK data to
show that consumption booms (concurrent with housing booms) tend to be driven
by younger consumers which they suggest is consistent with an income shock rather
than a wealth effect. This explanation, where a third factor is driving both the rise
in housing wealth and expenditure but separately, is termed the “common causality”
model in the literature.
Smith’s (2010) examination of New Zealand data, however, points to a stronger
impact on older households although there is still an aggregate impact. In other
words, while there is some distributional effect, there is also a significant relation-
ship between house prices and expenditure at the aggregate level.
Related to the “credit/collateral channel” is a potential role for a financial accel-
erator. Interest rates reflect, inter alia, credit risk and serve as a means to ration
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credit. When house prices rise, the increase in the value accrues to the homeowner
and thus provides additional equity. This additional equity may either be used to
reduce the loan to value ratio of the next house pruchase or is available to fund con-
sumption via housing equity withdrawal. Standard financial theory suggests that
a lower credit risk requires a lower interest rate and thus where risk is mitigated
(by increased collateral value, say), a lower mortgage interest rate should entail.
For a given benchmark risk-free interest rate, the spread between the mortgage rate
and the benchmark should thus narrow. At the other extreme, if the homeowner
extracts sufficient equity such that the loan to value ratio is unchanged, the spread
may remain constant but consumption would rise. Of course, some combination
of these two effects is possible with a modest decline in the spread and additional
consumption expenditure.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (hereafter referred to as BGG) lay out the
framework for a financial accelerator mechanism in the context of business capital
and how it may exacerbate economic cycles in a closed economy model. Key to BGG
is the incorporation of credit market frictions. Whereas economic models typically
use the risk-free interest rate as the key interest variable, in reality borrowers often
have to pay significantly higher interest rates. It would be obvious to any experi-
enced lender that extending loans involves a risk that the money may not be repaid
(or that in the event of the borrower defaulting, the quantum of funds recoverable
would be less than the principal and any accrued interest). As a result, lenders will
typically charge a premium over the risk free rate. BGG embody this as a risk pre-
mium paid by borrowers (firms). While in practice the size of the risk premium will
depend on a myriad of factors (that influence the ability to service and ultimately
repay or affect the cost of providing the funds) BGG simplify this relationship to
one of dependence on net assets. As a borrower’s net assets increase in value, the
likelihood that the lender will recover monies owed also increases, allowing for a
reduction in the risk premium. Conversely events that cause a reduction in the bor-
rower’s net assets serve to drive up the interest rate faced by the borrower. Thus to
the extent that net assets are co-cyclical with other economic shocks, the financial
accelerator mechanism serves to amplify the effect of the original shock.
In a similar vein, Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2002, 2002a, 2004) (hereafter APV)
apply the concept of a financial accelerator to the housing market and (household)
consumption, also in a closed economy model. Abstracting from explicit holdings of
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financial assets, APV set up a model in which household’s net assets are driven by
the value of the housing stock and the debt required to purchase the housing stock.
As the net value of the housing stock increases, the interest premium charged by
lenders on mortgages declines. Houseowners thus face both an increase in the equity
in their homes and a lower mortgage cost (for a given risk-free interest rate). Thus
they have the ability and incentive to withdraw some of the change in equity and
use it to fund consumption. A key element in the APV model is the heterogenous
households of which a portion is able to freely access the debt market while the
remainder are constrained by current income although both types are endowed with
housing assets. APV find that the financial accelerator amplifies the effect of shocks.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) set out a closed economy DSGE model that also includes
land as an explicit factor of production for housing. Their version of the financial
accelerator is embodied in the budget constraint of homeowners by setting a debt
limit for “impatient” households that is tied to the nominal value of the housing
stock. Thus a rise in the value of the housing stock allows impatient households
access to a greater amount of debt and thence fund consumption. As with APV,
both patient and impatient households have housing assets. To foreshadow discus-
sion in Chapter 2, I note that this treatment skips over the rationale for assuming
that households which do not accumulate wealth have a housing asset.
Chapters 2 and 3 set out a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
incorporating the financial accelerator. These build on the framework set up by
APV and use a small open economy setting with an expansion in Chapter 3 to in-
clude an explicit fiscal sector. These models are calibrated to match New Zealand
data. I find that the financial accelerator serves to amplify the effect of shocks on
the housing market but may dampen the effects on non-housing variables includ-
ing consumption. Chapter 4 examines the New Zealand data using a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR). While the house price-consumption relationship is
confirmed, the financial accelerator mechanism appears to be absent. Chapter 5
concludes with a summary of the results from the theoretical and empirical models
along with identification of areas for further research.
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Chapter 2
The basic small open economy
model
2.1 Introduction
The original APV model was constructed in a closed economy setting. In this
chapter, I set out a modified version incorporating an open economy extension and
calibrated for the New Zealand economy. The inclusion of a foreign sector makes the
model more applicable to a small open economy such as New Zealand. In particular,
the key open economy elements are as follows: the production function includes an
imported intermediate good, the goods producing sector sells to foreign consumers
in addition to home consumers, and a proportion of consumers are able to access
foreign capital markets. It should be noted that this model focuses on certain key
features of the New Zealand economy in order to avoid overly complicating the anal-
ysis. In particular, I follow APV in abstracting from productive capital. Similarly
I abstract from international trade in services, consumer imports and cross-border
investment. Thus the model does not seek to provide a basis for forecasting the be-
haviour of the New Zealand economy and especially the housing market but rather
attempts to highlight the mechanism by which the housing market may influence
aggregate economic activity (and vice versa).
This chapter is set out in the following manner. The components of the basic DSGE
model are set out in their standard form, followed by a summary of their log-linear
counterparts (the derivation of which is contained in Appendix C). The calibration
of the model parameters (including steady state values) using New Zealand data is
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then discussed. The basic model is then compared with the closed economy approach
adopted by APV. The effect of the financial accelerator is then explored, comparing
the basic model response with the response when the accelerator is switched off.
The sensitivity of the model to the presence of rule of thumb consumers is then
examined.
2.2 Overview
In the basic model there are three explicit agents in the economy: households, firms
and a monetary authority. All agents are assumed to be infinitely lived.
Following the framework used by APV, there are two types of households. The
first type of consumers is freely able to access the capital markets and is thus able
to smooth consumption across time by buying or selling financial assets. These
households follow the permanent income hypothesis and are thus denoted by the
term PIH. The other type of household exhibits rule of thumb consumption, spend-
ing all their income on consumption and are thus referred to hereinafter as ROT
consumers. ROT consumers are effectively completely credit constrained as they
have no access to the credit markets. This dimorphic characterisation of consumers
stems from Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) seminal work on consumption.
Unlike the model used by APV, in this thesis ROT households are further char-
acterised by the fact that they do not own any housing assets. This preserves
consistency so that households which cannot access the credit markets to smooth
consumption are also unable to access the credit markets to purchase a house i.e.
they would not be granted a mortgage. Given that residential mortgage lending
institutions (primarily banks in New Zealand) would be unwilling to extend credit
to potential borrowers who have no assets, not to mention insufficient funds for a
deposit on a house, this is not only reasonable but also arguably more realistic than
positing credit-constrained consumers repeatedly accessing the mortgage market.
Both types of consumers purchase goods from firms each period, receive wage in-
come from labour supplied to firms and pay rental to the homeowners.
PIH households are further divided into two complementary components: a home-
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owner and a consumer. The homeowner transacts in the housing market each period,
selling the housing stock and purchasing the stock anew. Against the net worth of
housing stock, the homeowner borrows to meet any shortfall between the price of
the housing stock bought at the end of the period and the price realised on sale of
the existing housing stock. Net worth is defined as the value of the housing stock
less outstanding debt and less any dividends paid to consumers. This dividend is
the mechanism by which housing equity withdrawal is captured. Homeowners also
charge a rental fee to consumers. Thus the housing stock is completely owned by
the PIH households and the ROT consumers pay rental to their PIH landlords.
Firms produce a continuum of consumer goods and are monopolistically compet-
itive. Each period they hire labour from households and also purchase an inter-
mediate input from overseas. These imports are used up each period and capital
is effectively assumed to be constant. The output of firms is consumed (by either
households or government), exported or used to produce additional housing stock.
The conversion of consumer goods to housing stock is assumed to follow a q-type
investment theory.
The monetary authority has a Taylor rule reaction function (with lagged inflation
and the output gap as indicators of inflationary pressure) and uses the nominal in-
terest rate as its lever subject to a smoothing parameter. In the basic model, there
is no role for fiscal policy and I exclude government spending as a demand shock
(especially as such a treatment would still require a funding source).
The model is specified in log-linear terms. The law of recursive motion is solved
for in MATLAB using Uhlig’s (1995) toolkit (code available on request).
2.3 Firms
Goods production is undertaken by firms. These goods are differentiated so that
there is monopolistic competition giving producers a degree of market power (in-
cluding the ability to set their prices) over the short run. Firms are assumed to
be domestically owned. While this is arguably a strong assumption given the high
degree of foreign ownership of New Zealand resident businesses, the assumption ab-
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stracts from the need to consider equity investment flows. While no firm dividend
is explicitly modelled in order to keep the model as simple as possible. Logically,
ownership of firms should reside with the PIH households as ROT households are
unable to build up savings in order to purchase an equity stake. However, if PIH
households do not view changes to firm dividends as permanent income changes,
then they will not alter their consumption behaviour in response.
Firms use a combination of labour and imported intermediate goods as inputs (in
combination with an exogenously given level of technology) by way of a CES pro-
duction function to produce consumption goods. The output of firm z is given by:
yt(z) = [αIMt(z)
γ + (1− α)(AtLt(z))
γ]
1
γ (2.3.1)
where IMt(z) is the quantity of intermediate imports used by firm z, Lt(z) is sim-
ilarly labour demand, At is economywide labour-augmenting technology, α is the
weight given to imports (and thus 1 − α is the weight on labour) and 1
1−γ
is the
elasticity of substitution between labour and imports.
Price stickiness is incorporated into the model through limiting the ability of firms to
reset their prices every period. Rather, each firm has a 25 percent chance to set the
price for its good, pt(z), each period, giving an average duration for its price of four
quarters. Firms maximise their profits by choosing pt(z) (when able) and thereby
indirectly labour and import quantities (minimising their cost given the price level
chosen). Their marginal cost condition aggregating across firms (with respect to
labour) is thus:
λt =
Wt
(1− α)Aγt
{
Yt
Lt
}1−γ (2.3.2)
Equating marginal costs across labour and intermediate imports yields:
(IMt
Lt
)1−γ
Aγt =
α
1− α
wt
RSt
(2.3.3)
where wt = Wt/Pt is the real wage rate and RSt is the real exchange rate.
Standard monopolistic competitition assumptions are made with firms setting the
price for their own goods but taking the aggregate consumption good price level and
overall aggregate price levels, Pc,t and Pt respectively, as given. Similarly firms view
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the nominal exchange rate, St (measured in domestic currency units per foreign cur-
rency unit), and the foreign price of imports, P ∗t , as given, reflecting the small size
of domestic firms relative to the world market for the intermediate inputs.1 Firms’
output is such that the demand for their goods (from either domestic use or foreign
demand) is just met. Thus the disposal of aggregate goods output may be written
as:
Yt = ct + It + EXt (2.3.4)
where ct is the consumption by households of consumer goods, It is the use of con-
sumer goods by house producers and EXt is foreign purchases.
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff(1996), consumer goods have an aggregate price level
given by:
Pc,t =
[∫ 1
0
pt(z)
1−dz
] 1
1−
(2.3.5)
where  is the price elasticity of demand faced by each firm.
It then follows that household demand for consumer goods is dependent on the
relative price in the following manner:
cjt(z) =
(
pt(z)
Pc,t
)
−
cjt (2.3.6)
where cjt(z) is the demand from consumer j of firm z’s good, pt(z) is the price of
good z, Pc,t is the aggregate price for all consumer goods and c
j
t is consumer j’s
demand across all goods.
Foreign demand is also assumed to follow a similar derivation but with an addi-
tional term from the nominal exchange rate:
EXt(z) =
(
S−1t pt(z)
S−1t Pc,t
)−
EXt
=
(
pt(z)
Pc,t
)
−
EXt (2.3.7)
1The definition of the nominal exchange rate as units of domestic currency per one foreign
currency unit means that an appreciation in the exchange rate is equivalent to decline in St.
Similarly, for the real exchange rate, a decline in RSt represents an appreciation. Thus, in the
following figures, a vertical drop represents an appreciation of the exchange rate.
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As per McCallum and Nelson (1999), I assume that aggregate export demand is
given by
EXt = (RSt)
ϑ(Y ft )
ζ (2.3.8)
where RSt =
StP
f
t
Pt
is the real exchange rate, Y ft is foreign output, and ϑ > 0, ζ > 0.
2.4 Households
Depending upon their consumption behaviour, there may be an additional home-
ownership component to the household. Rule of thumb (ROT) consumers do not
accumulate financial assets or liabilities and thus cannot logically accumulate suffi-
cient wealth so as to afford a deposit on a house (let alone purchase one outright).
In contrast, permanent income hypothesis (PIH) consumers are able to access the
capital markets and thus either save or borrow. PIH households thus own the stock
of housing. The homeowner component of the household rents the housing stock to
both ROT consumers and PIH consumers. PIH households sell and repurchase the
entire housing stock each period and depending upon their net worth relative to the
value of the housing stock, will pay a dividend to the PIH consumers.
Standard Dixit-Stiglitz assumptions on utility and demand lead to consumer j’s
demand for aggregated consumption goods (Equation 2.3.6). Consumers divide
their spending on consumer goods and housing rental according to the following
equations:
Ct =
[
υ
1
η (ct)
η−1
η + (1− υ)
1
η (ht)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2.4.1)
where υ is the share of expenditure on consumer goods and η is the elasticity of
substitution between consumption goods and housing.
ct = υ
(
Pc,t
Pt
)
−η
Ct
= υX−ηc,t Ct (2.4.2)
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where Xc,t =
Pc,t
Pt
is the relative price of the representative consumption good.
ht = (1− υ)
(
Ph,t
Pt
)
−η
Ct
= (1− υ)X−ηh,t Ct (2.4.3)
where Xh,t =
Ph,t
Pt
is the relative price of rental services.
Consumers’ intra-period utility is given by
logCt + ξlog(1− Lt)
where ξ is the disutility of labour coefficient.
Both types of consumers seek to maximise this but are subject to different time
horizons and budget constraints. ROT consumers allocate each period’s income to
either goods consumption or rental. Hence ROT consumer utility maximisation is
subject to the following single-period constraint:
Crt = wtL
r
t (2.4.4)
where Crt is aggregate consumption by ROT consumers and L
r
t is the labour supplied
by ROT consumers. In other words, ROT consumption is not affected by changing
expectations and is simply dependent on current period income. As a result, as
shown in Appendix C, labour supply by ROT households is constant so that
Lrt =
1
1 + ξ
(2.4.5)
In contrast, PIH consumers borrow or lend in order to smooth their consumption
across time. In keeping with the small open economy concept, there are no restric-
tions on the flow of capital. However, this is not the same as complete markets and
does not automatically result in an equalisation of the domestic and foreign inter-
est rates.2 The De Paoli (2009) treatment of foreign currency borrowing adopted
here is to make the domestic interest rate equal to the foreign interest rate plus a
premium (ψ), the size of which is positively related to aggregate real foreign debt
2Indeed, New Zealand is well known for having a significant interest rate premium despite
relatively open capital markets.
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levels (ψ′(.) > 0).
Rt+1 = (R
f
t+1)ψ (RStBF,t) (2.4.6)
where BF,t is the issuance (positive) or purchase (negative) of real foreign currency
debt by consumers and Rt+1 the real domestic interest rate from period t to t + 1.
Thus PIH consumers face the following budget constraint (expressed in real terms):
CPt + BH,t−1 +RStBF,t−1 =
BH,t
(Rt+1)
+
RStBF,t
(Rft+1)ψ (RStBF,t)
+
Wt
Pt
Lpt +Dt (2.4.7)
where Cpt is consumption by PIH consumers, L
p
t is the labour supplied by PIH con-
sumers, BH,t is the face value of real domestic currency bonds issued (or sold) at
time t with maturity t + 1, Rft+1 is the foreign interest rate and Dt is the dividend
paid by homeowners to consumers.
Maximising intra-period utility with respect to consumption and domestic bond
holdings yields:
1
CPt
= Rft+1ψ(RStBF,t)βEt
(
1
CPt+1
RSt+1
RSt
)
(2.4.8)
Substituting this into the first order condition with respect to foreign bond holdings
results in:
Rt+1 = R
f
t+1ψ(RStBF,t)Et
(
RSt+1
RSt
)
(2.4.9)
Foreign consumers are assumed to trade only in foreign currency bonds. As noted
by De Paoli (2009), the assumption that idiosyncratic risk is pooled domestically
allows for only foreign currency denominated bonds to be traded in equilibrium and
the net foreign asset position to be identified.
In keeping with BGG, the cost of borrowing for the purchase of housing capital
is at a premium to the risk-free interest rate, this premium varying inversely with
the extent that the borrower has net positive wealth. Because of the agency problem
mortgage lenders will only lend to homeowners at a premium to the risk-free rate.
Homeowners will stand to make a gain (or loss) on their capital in addition to the
rental from consumers. They will borrow up to the point that the cost of borrowing
is just equal to their expected return from the housing asset. Thus,
EtRh,t+1 = f
(
Nt+1
qt ht+1
)
Rt+1 (2.4.10)
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where EtRh,t+1 is the expected rate of return on owning housing from period t to
t+ 1, Nt+1 is the net worth of the household determined at the end of period t and
thus carried over into period t+ 1, qt is the real price of housing in period t, f
′ < 0
and ht+1 is the stock of housing determined at the end of period t and carried over
into period t+ 1.
Housing stock bought in period t is rented to consumers in period t + 1. In ad-
dition, the price of the housing stock may change thus providing a capital gain or
loss. Finally, depreciation (δ) is assumed to erode some of the value of the existing
housing stock. Thus, the return to homeowners may be expressed as:
EtRh,t+1 = Et
(
Xh,t+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
)
(2.4.11)
The key element of the financial accelerator mechanism is the net worth of home-
owners. At the start of each period, the value of homeowners is given by the return
on housing multiplied by the housing stock (determined in period t − 1) less the
debt and interest incurred:
Vt = Rh,tqt−1ht − f
(
Nt
qt−1ht
)
Rtbt (2.4.12)
where bt, the borrowing undertaken to finance the purchase of the housing stock, is
equal to qtht+1 −Nt+1.
In order to capture the possibility of housing equity withdrawal (or even injection),
a dividend from homeowners to consumers is included. The size of the dividend is
determined by the homeowner’s net worth:
Dt = χ
(
Nt+1
qtht+1
)
(2.4.13)
where χ′ > 0.
After paying the dividend (Dt) to PIH consumers, the net worth of homeowners
is given by
Nt+1 = Vt −Dt (2.4.14)
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2.5 Housing investment
In keeping with APV, investment and house prices are linked by a Tobin’s q rela-
tionship, in that house producers’ investment relative to the exisiting housing stock
is driven by the price of housing compared to the cost of its replacement. House
producers purchase It of the consumption goods and use this to produce ht+1 units
of housing:
ht+1 = Φ
(
It
ht
)
ht
where Φ(.) is concave, giving rise to the equilibrium condition of
qt
Xc,t
= Φ′
(
It
ht
)
(2.5.1)
2.6 Monetary authority
The monetary authority uses a Taylor rule comprising the nominal interest rate for
current period (interest to be paid in the following period), the last period’s goods
price inflation and an output gap measure.
Rˆnt+1 = ρiRˆ
n
t + (1− ρi)γpipˆit−1 + (1− ρi)γy ˆygapt (2.6.1)
where ρi is the smoothing coefficient, γpi is the weight on lagged inflation and γy is
the weight on the output gap. The gap is defined as the difference between actual
output and the output level achievable under fully flexible prices. Thus the flexible
price output response in the following figures is graphically the difference between
the output and output gap responses.
2.7 Current account
The current account is the sum of the resource constraints for all agents in the
economy. For the combined consumer, homeowner and houseproducer there are net
expenditures of ct+ It+RStBF,t−1+BH,t−1 with revenues of
RStBF,t
R
f
t+1ψ(.)
+
BH,t
Rt+1
+ Wt
Pt
Lt.
For goods producing firms, expenditures are Wt
Pt
Lt − RStIMt while revenues are
Yt. Assuming that domestic currency debt is in net zero supply, then the current
19
account reduces to
RStBF,t−1 =
RStBF,t
Rft+1ψ(.)
+ EXt −RStIMt (2.7.1)
2.8 Shock processes
The model is subject to four different shocks, namely a technology shock, a domestic
nominal interest rate shock, a foreign real interest rate shock and a foreign demand
shock. The shock processes are stationary and have similar forms, such that for each
shock, k, its log difference is given by
kˆt = ρkkˆt−1 + k,t.
where 0 < ρk < 1 , ensuring that the processes are stationary.
3
While there is some appeal to modelling permanent shocks, this can be problemmatic
for economies that are subject to multiple shock types. A permanent shock effec-
tively imparts a trend to the model and as noted by Benesˇ et al. (2009), estimation
of a DSGE model with trends may not be possible due to insufficient observations
given the need to pin down multiple trends.
2.9 Log-linear model equations
The derivation of the log-linear equations is set out in Appendix C. Variables with
a hat are the percentage change from their steady state value and variables without
a subscript are the steady state values. The key equations as they appear in the
Matlab code are as follows:
Yˆt = ϕ ˆIM t + (1− ϕ)(Aˆt + Lˆt) (2.9.1)
ˆIM t = Lˆt +
1
1− γ
wˆt −
γ
1− γ
Aˆt −
1
1− γ
RˆSt (2.9.2)
mˆct = wˆt − (1− γ)ϕ ˆIM t + (1− γ)ϕLˆt − [(1− γ)(1− ϕ) + γ]Aˆt (2.9.3)
3Stationarity of the technology shock is a particularly strong assumption. However, this also
means that it is not necessary to deflate real variables by the technology process At.
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Yˆt =
( c
Y
)
cˆt +
(
I
Y
)
Iˆt +
(
EX
Y
)
EˆX t (2.9.4)
EˆX t = ϑRˆSt + ζYˆ
f
t (2.9.5)
Xˆc,t = −
1− ν
ν
(
Xh
Xc
)1−η
Xˆh,t (2.9.6)
cˆt = Cˆt − ηXˆc,t (2.9.7)
Xˆh,t =
1
η
Cˆt −
1
η
hˆt (2.9.8)
Cˆrt =
wLr
Cr
wˆt (2.9.9)
Cˆpt = EtCˆ
p
t+1 − Rˆt+1 (2.9.10)
Cˆpt = wˆt +
Lp
1− Lp
Lˆpt (2.9.11)
Cˆt = nCCˆ
p
t + (1− nC)Cˆ
r
t (2.9.12)
Lˆt = nlLˆ
p
t (2.9.13)
Rˆt+1 = Rˆ
f
t+1 + δbbˆt + EtRˆSt+1 − RˆSt (2.9.14)
EtRˆh,t+1 = Rˆt+1 + Ω(Nˆt+1 − qˆt − hˆt+1) (2.9.15)
Rˆh,t = (1− µ)Xˆh,t + µqˆt − qˆt−1 (2.9.16)
Nˆt+1 = Rh[(bn+1)Rˆh,t+(1−bnΩ)Nˆt+bnΩ(qˆt−1+ hˆt)−bnRˆt]−(Rh−1)Dˆt (2.9.17)
Dˆt =
χ′(φ)
χ(φ)
φ(Nˆt+1 − qˆt − hˆt+1) (2.9.18)
hˆt+1 = δIˆt + (1− δ)hˆt (2.9.19)
qˆt = Γd(Iˆt − hˆt) + Xˆc,t (2.9.20)
Rˆnt+1 = Rˆt+1 + Etpˆit+1 (2.9.21)
Rˆnt+1 = ρiRˆ
n
t + (1− ρi)γpipˆit−1 + (1− ρi)γy ˆgapt (2.9.22)
βC
[
bt (1 + aδb)− aRˆ
f
t+1
]
= bt−1C + b[∆Sˆt + pˆi
f
t − pˆit]
− EX
[
ζYˆ ft + ϑRˆSt
]
+
SP f
P
IM
[
ˆIM t + RˆSt
]
(2.9.23)
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pˆit = pˆic,t − Xˆc,t + Xˆc,t−1 (2.9.24)
pˆic,t = κmˆct + βEtpˆic,t+1 (2.9.25)
EtRˆSt+1 − RˆSt = EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt + Etpˆi
f
t+1 − Etpˆit+1 (2.9.26)
where
φ =
N
qh
ϕ =
αIMγ
αIMγ + (1− α)(AL)γ
µ =
(1− δ)q
Xh + (1− δ)q
Γd =
Φ′′(I/h)
Φ′(I/h)
(
I
h
)
nC = n
Cp
C
nL = n
Lp
L
bn =
1
φ
− 1
Ω =
f ′(φ)
f(φ)
φ
κ =
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
δb = −ψ
′(RS BF )C
2.10 Parameterisation and calibration - Consis-
tency with NZ data
In determining the steady state, I have attempted to use parameter and variable
values that are broadly consistent with New Zealand data. The introduction of
the open economy requires a judgment as to which data should be used to cali-
brate the import and export related parameters. Given that the model abstracts
from services and also consumer goods imports, two possible treatments suggest
themselves in order to establish steady state imports: using only data on capital
and intermediate imports or disregarding the nature of the components and using
aggregate data on exports and imports. Either approach has its own drawbacks.
Focusing only on intermediate (including capital) imports is implicitly equivalent
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to saying that imported consumption goods play no role in the economy. In real-
ity, New Zealand relies heavily on imports for a variety of consumption goods with
consumption goods accounting for a quarter of all merchandise imports. Similarly,
services imports comprised around a quarter of all imports over the last two decades.
Against these factors, including consumption goods as part of imports would over-
state the extent to which producers rely on imported goods. Similarly, while imports
of business services may well be used by firms producing in New Zealand, personal
services (for example overseas travel expenses) are clearly not.
An additional important consideration is the relationship with the current account.
New Zealand has historically run a current account deficit and this is part of the
reason why its interest rates have also historically been subject to a significant
country-risk premium. Rather than focus on the components of the current account
that most closely match the model definitions, I use the debits and credits data
from Statistics New Zealand current account data. Given that this thesis explicitly
models a premium based on the level of foreign debt, it is appropriate to set the
steady state trade parameters so that there is a steady state current account deficit
and thus a steady state premium in the domestic interest rate.4
The CES share parameter for imports (α) is set at 0.2, lower than import weights
for other New Zealand-calibrated DSGE models (see Table 3.4). Although empiri-
cally the dollar value of capital and intermediate imports is large in comparison to
gross labour earnings, I attribute the share parameter that would accrue to capital
to labour instead, in line with the implied household ownership of firms.
In keeping with the general approach to using DSGE models, the coefficient for
leisure utility (ξ) is set so that the steady state supply of labour is equal to 0.33.
The elasticity of substitution between imports and labour is set such that γ = −0.2,
reflecting a relatively modest degree of complementarity between labour and im-
ports. This is considerably smaller in absolute value than the value estimated by
Szeto (2002) for the substitution between imported and domestically produced goods
for a New Zealand CES production function. However, given that Szeto’s model is
4The steady state ratios are calculated using (GNE + current account credits) as the denomi-
nator, where GNE includes government spending. While this is inconsistent with the underlying
basic model structure, the inclusion of government spending is done to allow for comparison with
the fiscal model of Chapter 3.
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a nested CES with labour and imports at different levels, it is not directly compa-
rable. More importantly, the choice of γ is constrained by the need to ensure that
the flexible price output reacts sensibly to a technology shock (see Equation C.16.8).
The proportion of PIH consumers is set to 0.7, in line with the RBNZ FPS model
assumption (Black et al., 1997). The RBNZ’s DSGE model, KITT, (Benesˇ et al,
2009) does not distinguish between different consumer types.
The weight on goods consumption (ν) of 0.81 is set to be consistent with the ex-
penditure weights obtained from Statistics New Zealand’s Household Expenditure
Surveys. The net worth to housing value ratio (φ = N
qh
) is set to 0.7, which is also the
value used in RBNZ’s KITT. Over the past twenty years, net worth in New Zealand
(as measured by the the value of the housing stock less claims on households) as a
proportion of the value of the housing stock has averaged around 70-75%. However,
it should be noted that this includes a period of sustained decline until the early
2000s. In addition, the RBNZ’s measure of household equity injection was approxi-
mately zero at times when the net worth ratio was around 70-73%.
The steady state interest rate premium (2.6% on an annual basis) is obtained from
the historical average of the RBNZ’s Variable First Home Mortgage series over the
risk-free 90-day Treasury Bill interest rate.
The coefficients (ρi, γpi and γy) in the monetary policy rule are estimated from
a simple regression of the risk-free rate on its own one period lag, lagged inflation
and the output gap.5
The cost of intermediation in the foreign currency bond market, δb is set to -0.001,
following Thoenissen (2004).
A number of the deep structural parameters cannot be identified (at least easily)
from empirical data and the values used are set broadly in line with other studies
and adjusted so that the moments generated by the extended model in Chapter 3
approximate the empirical data. The specifics are set out in more detail in Chapter
5Specifically, the estimates for ρi, γpi and γy are 0.89, 1.01, and 0.18, respectively. The inflation
and output gap coefficients are somewhat smaller than the standard assumed values of 1.5 and 0.5,
respectively.
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Parameter Description Basic model
φ Steady state net worth to housing stock value (N/qh) 0.7
EX/Y Steady state export/output ratio 0.245
IM/Y Steady state import/output ratio 0.282
ν Steady state goods consumption as a proportion of overall consumption 0.81
f(φ) Steady state interest rate premium factor 1.0064
n Proportion of consumers that are PIH 0.7
χ′(φ)
χ(φ) φ Sensitivity of dividend to net worth ratio 3
Γd q-theory sensitivity 0.52
Ω Sensitivity of interest rate premium to φt -0.1
ξ Leisure coefficient in utility function 1.1097
β Discount rate 0.99
δ Housing depreciation rate 0.005
ϑ Export sensitivity to real exchange rate 1
ζ Export sensitivity to foreign demand 1
α Import weight in production function 0.2
γ Labour-imports substitution coefficient in production function -0.2
η Consumer substitution between housing and goods coefficient 1
ρi Interest rate smoothing coefficient 0.89
ρa Autocorrelation for technology shock 0.18
ρRf Autocorrelation of foreign interest rate shock 0.89
ρY f Autocorrelation of foreign demand shock 0.85
ρXii Autocorrelation of interest rate shock 0.40
γpi Coefficient on inflation in monetary policy rule 1.01
γy Coefficient on output gap in monetary policy rule 0.18
1− θ Probability of firm resetting its price 0.25
Table 2.1: Basic model parameter values
3.3. In order for the basic model and the fiscal model to be comparable, I use the
same parameter values across model types. As a result the moments for the basic
model are further from the observed values. Matching moments for the basic model
would require different parameter values and it would thus be difficult to establish
whether the differences in model responses are due to assumed parameter values or
the different model structure.
2.11 Steady state
In order to calculate the recursive laws of motion for the the log-linear model (which
essentially works off deviations from an assumption of being initially in the steady
state), a number of steady state values are required (e.g. IM , L). Thus in order to
make the model consistent, these parameters should be based on a computed steady
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state which is in turn consistent with empirical data. This latter aspect, of course,
relies on further assumptions as to whether the data is reflective of a steady state.
The steady state relationships implied by the model equations mean that it is pos-
sible to derive the steady state by using only a small subset of the model variables.
This thesis uses the real price of housing and the stock of housing as the key variables
upon which the rest of the steady state may be calculated. In addition, the disutility
of labour coefficient, ξ, is set so that the steady state provision of labour is equal
to 0.33. The steady state relationships are set out below with the derivations from
the equilibrium equations in Appendix E. Using these relationships, in combination
with the assumed parameter values (detailed in Table 2.1) allow for the key steady
state values to be computed (see Table 2.2).
The process of computing the steady state begins as follows. The real house price
(q) and housing stock (h) are set. The net worth to housing stock ratio parameter
(φ = N
qh
, calibrated at 0.7) then determines the net worth (N) via Equation 2.11.1.
The discount rate is set to 0.99 (consistent with other DSGE model values), implying
a steady state real interest rate (R) of 4.1% per annum. The mortgage interest rate
- risk-free benchmark premium is estimated at 2.6% per annum and this determines
the steady state return on housing (Rh) via Equation 2.11.2. The return on housing
and net worth then determine the dividend from the homeowner to the consumer
(D). The real house price and return on housing (Rh) determine the relative price of
rental (Xh), which then determines the relative price of the consumption good (Xc).
The housing stock and Xh determine aggregate consumption (C) from which goods
consumption (c) is determined. This process sequentially calculates the steady state
values, ultimately determining the steady state consumption of goods and housing
rental values for both the ROT and PIH consumers.
There are five exogenous steady state variables (real house price, housing stock,
aggregate labour, the real exchange rate and technology) which are used to cal-
culate the additional sixteen steady state variables (endogenously). Both the real
exchange rate and technology are normalised to 1 in the steady state to simplify the
equations, leaving the first three as the basis on which the steady state is calculated.
The steady state equations used to derive the steady state variable values are as
follows:
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Nqh
= 0.7 (2.11.1)
Rh = f
(
N
qh
)
R (2.11.2)
Xh = [Rh − (1− δ)]q (2.11.3)
1 = [υX1−ηc + (1− υ)X
1−η
h ]
1
1−η (2.11.4)
D = N(Rh − 1) (2.11.5)
C =
h
(1− υ)X−ηh
(2.11.6)
c = υX−ηc C (2.11.7)
I = δh (2.11.8)
Y =
c+ I
1− EX
Y
(2.11.9)
L =
(
Y γ − IMγ
1− α
) 1
γ
(2.11.10)
(
IM
L
)1−γ
=
α
1− α
w
RS
(2.11.11)
w =
Cξ
(1− L)
(2.11.12)
EX =
EX
Y
Y (2.11.13)
IM =
IM
Y
Y (2.11.14)
EX = RERϑ(Y f )ζ (2.11.15)
2.12 Comparison with a closed economy model
Identifying the specific differences that result from including an open economy re-
quires a comparable closed economy model. The closed economy model follows the
structure of the APV model but specifically drops the dividend from the ROT bud-
get constraint and eliminates the unfunded government demand for goods. It should
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Variable Description Basic model No accelerator
Exogenous values
q Real house price 5.9382 8.4942
h Housing stock 0.5 0.5
L Aggregate labour 0.33 0.33
RS Real exchange rate 1 1
A Technology 1 1
Endogenous values
Rh Return on housing 1.0166 1.0101
Xc Relative price of consumption good 1.6187 1.6187
Xh Relative price of renting 0.1283 0.1283
I Housing investment 0.0025 0.0025
N Net worth 2.0784 2.9730
D Housing dividend 0.0345 0.0300
C Aggregate consumption 0.3376 0.3376
Y Real output 0.2271 0.2271
w Real wage 0.5592 0.5592
IM Imports 0.0640 0.0640
EX Exports 0.0556 0.0556
EX −RS IM Current account -0.0084 -0.0084
c Goods consumption 0.1690 0.1690
Lr ROT labour supply 0.4740 0.4740
Lp PIH labour supply 0.2683 0.2683
Cr ROT consumption 0.2651 0.2651
Cp PIH consumption 0.3687 0.3687
Table 2.2: Open economy model steady state values
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be noted that a single factor of production closed economy model is not entirely com-
parable with a two-factor open economy model as there are a number of structural
issues that are likely contribute to the difference in responses. The flexible price
output plays a key role here. In particular, the real exchange rate has a significant
influence on the open economy model responses across both types of shocks (i.e. an
unexpected shock reduction in the nominal interest rate by 25 basis points and a
1% shock increase in technology) discussed below. That said, the manner in which
the real exchange rate influences the responses does vary across the shock types and
thus they warrant discussion individually. Overall, the non-housing market vari-
ables display a stronger reaction to the shocks in the basic open economy model
than the closed economy model but the reaction of the housing market variables
may be shock specific.
2.12.1 Response to an interest rate shock
The responses of the closed and basic (open) models to a 25 basis point shock re-
duction in the nominal interest rate are shown in Figure 2.1. The open economy
displays a somewhat more muted response to the interest rate shock than the closed
economy model across all variables with the sole exception of the output gap.
The reduction in the nominal interest rate in the shock period leads to a reduction
in the real interest rate. Expected inflation is above the steady state (see below) and
thus there is an unambiguous reduction in the real interest rate in the shock period.
PIH consumption increases in both the closed and basic models as a result of the
lower real interest rate. In the basic model there is an additional effect as the real
interest rate reduction leads to a depreciation in the real exchange rate. Although
this increases export demand, it also reduces the flexible price output level as import
prices increase. This results in the basic model output gap increasing more than
the closed economy and as a consequence the monetary policy response in the basic
model is also stronger, offsetting some of the initial shock and also increasing the
real interest rate. Thus the basic model PIH consumption response is moderated
relative to the closed model and consequently a smaller output of goods is required
and thus the wage rate response in the basic model is more moderate compared
to the closed economy increase, which further reduces demand as ROT consumers
reduce spending. The overall reduction in goods consumption outweighs the effect
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of increased export demand due to the higher weighting of consumption in the al-
location of output ( c
Y
is 0.744 versus EX
Y
of 0.245), resulting in an unambiguous
decline in output relative to the closed model. Given that the responses of output
and investment are weaker in the basic model, it logically follows that the real house
price should be lower than the closed economy model.
Overall, the basic model shows that in response to an expansionary nominal in-
terest rate shock it will display less variability in consumption, output, wages and
prices due to the presence of the exchange rate effect on exports and imports. In
effect, the real exchange rate provides a mechanism which absorbs part of the impact
of the interest rate shock and decreases volatility relative to the closed economy.
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Figure 2.1: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, closed economy model
and basic model
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Figure 2.1: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, closed economy model
and basic model (continued)
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Figure 2.1: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, closed economy model
and basic model (continued)
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Figure 2.1: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, closed economy model
and basic model (continued)
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2.12.2 Response to a technology shock
The responses of the models to a 1% increase in technology are shown in Figure 2.2.
Immediately, it can be seen that the housing market response in the basic model
response is stronger than the closed model.However, the responses need to be inter-
preted with care as the different production functions have a significant impact on
the flexible price output.
Technology enters the model through the production function. Given that the only
variables in the production function in the closed economy are technology (which is
not a choice variable) and labour, technology assumes a more significant role in the
production function compared to the basic open economy model. This is particularly
clear in the flexible price output equations for the closed model (which is ultimately
only a function of technology) and the basic model (which is also a function of the
real exchange rate):
Closed economy Yˆ flext =
1
1− (1− α)(1− L)
Aˆt (2.12.1)
Basic model Yˆ flext =
(1− α)
(
AL
Y
)γ 1+τ
1−γ+τ
(1− α)
(
AL
Y
)γ
− (1−γ)
1−γ+τ
Aˆt−
α(IM/Y )γ
(1− γ)
[
(1− α)
(
AL
Y
)γ
− (1−γ)
1−γ+τ
]RˆSt
(2.12.2)
where τ = L
1−L
.
Whereas in the basic model the real exchange rate affects the cost of imports and
thus also the maximising behaviour of producers, there is no such effect in the closed
economy model. The difference in the underlying production function means direct
comparisons should be made with care. In addition, Equations (2.12.1) and (2.12.2)
highlight the the real exchange rate channel through which a technology shock af-
fects the basic model but not the closed version.
Although in the basic model the reduction in the real interest rate results in a
depreciation of the real exchange rate in the shock period, this is not sufficient to
overcome the effect of the technology shock on flexible price output. As a result the
technology shock generates an even larger negative output gap in the basic model
and via the monetary policy reaction rule, elicits a decline in the nominal and real
interest rates relative to the closed economy model.
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Consumption by PIH consumers thus rises more in the basic model, requiring a
higher wage response and thus driving ROT consumption higher as well. The un-
ambiguously higher consumption in turn drives up the relative price of rental (given
the initially fixed stock of housing) and drives down the relative price consumption
goods. The ratio of the house price to the consumption good price is thus driven
higher. Investment rises in response. Given the rise in the return on housing and
stronger investment, a positive house price response would also follow.6
Whereas an interest rate shock response is more easily compared across model types,
the responses to a technology shock are highly dependent on the differences in their
respective production functions. That aside, the comparison with the closed econ-
omy shows that the response of an open economy may be significantly different from
those suggested by a closed economy model.
6A decline in the house price would move away from the equilibrium condition of (2.9.16),
requiring an even higher relative price of rental and thus leading to a non-feasible explosive outcome.
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Figure 2.2: Response to a 1 % technology shock, basic model and closed economy
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Figure 2.2: Response to a 1 % technology shock, basic model and closed economy
(continued)
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Figure 2.2: Response to a 1 % technology shock, basic model and closed economy
(continued)
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Figure 2.2: Response to a 1 % technology shock, basic model and closed economy
(continued)
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Relative to the closed economy model, the responses of the basic economy to the
two shocks are summarised in Table 2.3.
Sector Interest rate shock Technology shock
Housing Smaller Larger
Consumption & Output Smaller Larger
Table 2.3: Basic model response relative to closed model, technology and interest
rate shocks
2.13 Impact of the financial accelerator
The effect of incorporating a financial accelerator is examined by comparing the
impulse response functions derived from two models. In the model with no finan-
cial accelerator the steady state mortgage interest rate faced by homeowners (and
thence the return on housing) is delinked from their net worth ratio. This is done
by way of two adjustments to the basic open economy model. First, the steady state
premium is set to zero (i.e. in terms of Equation 2.11.2, f(N
qh
) = 1), as discussed in
subsection 2.13.2. This in itself has relatively little impact as the model is specified
in dynamic terms. The second, and arguably more important modification, is to set
the responsiveness of the mortgage debt interest rate (which is equal to the return
on housing) to the net worth ratio to zero (Ω = 0 in Equations 2.9.15 and 2.9.17)
and is discussed in subsection 2.13.3.
The steady state for the model with the financial accelerator switched off varies
slightly from the basic model (see Table 2.2). In particular, a higher real house
price is necessary to ensure the net worth-housing value ratio is 0.7. As a result,
net worth is higher. The dividend is lower as this is determined by both net worth
and the return on housing, the latter of which is equal to the real interest rate
when f(φ) = 1. In fact, the higher real house price is offset by the lower return on
housing and as a result the relative price of rental is the same whether or not the
financial accelerator is switched off. This, combined with the holding of the housing
stock constant means that aggregate consumption is unchanged. It then follows that
goods consumption, investment, output, the wage rate and the dissaggregation of
consumption and labour across consumer types are all the same.
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2.13.1 Monetary policy shock
Figure 2.3 compares the impulse responses of the basic model model with the re-
sponses of the model with the financial accelerator switched off to an interest rate
shock in the form of a 25 basis point cut to the nominal interest rate. Unsurpris-
ingly, the most significant differences relate to the housing market. In general, the
presence of the financial accelerator gives rise to a larger housing market reaction
to the interest rate shock.
Figure 2.3: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, basic model with and
without the financial accelerator
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Figure 2.3: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, basic model with and
without the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure 2.3: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, basic model with and
without the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure 2.3: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, basic model with and
without the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure 2.3: Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate shock, basic model with and
without the financial accelerator (continued)
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Marginal cost                 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Wage                          
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Exports                       
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Imports                       
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Output                        
Quarters (shock in t=1)
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
Output gap                    
Quarters (shock in t=1)
 
 
Basic model No accelerator
46
2.13.2 Setting the premium to zero
The steady state premium for the interest rate faced by homeowners in the basic
open economy model is set to 260 basis points on a per annum basis. In order to
remove this impact of this, I set the premium to zero (i.e. setting f( Nt+1
qtht+1
) = 1
in Equation 2.4.10) in the model with no financial accelerator.7 This reduces the
steady state return required by homeowners. As a result, the steady state quantum
of housing (and thus both rental supply and rental demand) must be higher in the
model with no premium. This highlights the frictional nature of the financial accel-
erator in that while it may reinforce the impact of various shocks, it also acts as an
imperfection in the housing market.
For completeness sake, I note that the reduction in the steady state return on hous-
ing also impacts on the evolution of net worth. However, it is also worth noting
that although this serves to dampen the response of net worth to its various deter-
minants, this is not the dominant effect in comparing the behaviour of net worth
across models.
2.13.3 Setting the responsiveness of the return on housing
to zero
Equation (2.4.10) sets out the relationship between the expected return on housing
(equivalent in equilibrium to the interest rate charged on mortgages), net worth
and the real interest rate. This represents the key financial accelerator mechanism,
explicitly linking the mortgage interest rate to the homeowner’s net worth ratio. By
setting Ω = f
′(φ)
f(φ)
φ to zero in the log-linear model, this mechanism is removed.
The impact of the financial accelerator is most evident in the housing market vari-
ables. Using an expansionary monetary policy shock (i.e. an unexpected reduction
in the nominal interest rate), the basic model displays significantly greater response
in terms of the reactions of the real house price, investment, housing capital and net
worth compared to the model with no financial accelerator. The return on housing
(equivalent to the mortgage rate) does react more strongly initially but unlike the
other housing market variables the responses with and without the financial accel-
7Although a model with no financial accelerator may still incorporate a constant premium for
mortgage interest rates above the interest rate, this raises the question of how the existence of a
(fixed) premium can be justified while at the same time it is invariant to the borrower’s net worth.
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rator converge quickly.
Following the stronger house price and net worth reaction, the initial dividend re-
sponse will also be stronger in the presence of the financial accelerator. It is worth
noting that when the financial accelerator is switched off, the dividend declines in a
relatively linear fashion after its initial jump in the shock period. In contrast under
the basic model the dividend declines more rapidly as the net worth ratio moder-
ates and thus unwinds the additional stimulus provided by the compressed finance
premium.
The increase in the return on housing in the shock period is the result of both
an increase in real house prices as well as the current relative price of rental ser-
vices. Given that the corollary to the latter is a lower relative consumption goods
price, Equation (2.5.1) requires that the impact on investment is an unambiguous
increase. In effect, real house prices rise faster than goods inflation resulting in an
increase in investment.
Contrary to APV, however, I find that consumption becomes more sensitive to
an interest rate shock in the absence of a financial accelerator. While it is true
that the presence of Ω jointly with a positive steady state premium is the result of
informational imperfections (i.e. the inability of lenders to costlessly monitor bor-
rowers), their setting to zero should not be automatically read as if this inefficiency
were removed. Indeed, as an alternative version of the model (responses available
upon request), I allow the steady state premium to remain at 2.6% but set Ω to
zero. Thus the informational asymmetry persists but does not change with shifting
perceptions of risk. The impulse responses are practically identical to those given
when both the premium and Ω are set to zero, suggesting that the main driver here
is Ω, not the steady state premium. The somewhat counter-intuitive result (i.e.
increasing the premium sensitivity to net worth reduces the consumption response)
stems from the separation of the net worth position from the consumer aspect of the
household. Whereas APV had allowed ROT consumers to benefit from increasing
net worth, I remove this effect.
The presence of a financial accelerator allows for a greater impact on the housing
sector. With a larger impact on house prices, this effectively draws more resources
into the housing sector (investment is higher in the basic model). Given the larger re-
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sultant housing stock under the model with a financial accelerator, there is tendency
for the relative price of rental to decline for longer (the corollary to which is that the
relative price of the consumption good will tend to rise for longer). The net impact
of this is to lower the inflation path and increase the real interest rate path relative
to the model without the financial accelerator. In turn, the higher real interest rate
response reduces consumption on the part of the PIH consumers. This in turn re-
duces the need for labour services on the part of firms and thus wage reductions are
experienced by both PIH and ROT households, reinforcing the consumption decline.
This phenomenon may also be explained in a more mechanical way. When an
expansionary monetary policy shock occurs it boosts the housing market (initially
through increased demand for housing services which only adjust with a lag). The
improvement in the net worth ratio leads to a reduction in the premium. Given that
homeowners equate returns on housing to the cost, the reduced premium means that
homeowners come to expect a further reduction in the return on housing. This re-
quires that either (relative) rental or house prices are expected to be lower than
otherwise. Given that the housing market has been boosted by the shock, the effect
is more likely to come in the form of reduced rental as investment in housing adds to
the stock. If relative rentals are lower than previously anticipated, the relative price
of consumption goods must be higher (by definition). The net effect is a reduction in
expected inflation compared to when there is no accelerator and this in turn implies
a higher real interest rate and less consumption.
2.13.4 Technology and other shocks - comparison of basic
model with model without financial accelerator
The responses of the model without the financial accelerator and the basic model
to shocks to technology, the foreign real interest rate and foreign demand are shown
in Appendix A.
Following a technology shock, as with the monetary policy shock, most of the real
economy variables display similar behaviour whether or not the financial accelerator
is switched on or not. Where there are noticeable differences in the impulse response
functions (IRF) between the basic model and the model with the financial accelera-
tor switched off, a similar explanation to that in the context of the monetary policy
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shock effect is possible. In particular, the higher net worth response under the basic
model allows for higher real house prices and a greater deviation away from the
steady state housing capital (both in terms of the shock period and in subsequent
periods).
Both the foreign interest rate and foreign demand shocks show a high degree of
similarity between the impulse responses with and without the finanical accelerator
when considering the non-housing market variables. As with the interest rate and
technology shocks, housing market variables exhibit a noticeable divergence between
the two model variants. In particular, real house prices, net worth (at least initially)
and the stock of housing show greater sensitivity to the shocks when the financial
accelerator is switched on.
2.13.5 Role of ROT consumers
ROT consumers are often included in models in order capture consumer behaviour
that is generally apparent in empirical data but cannot be explained by models based
on Ricardian only behaviour. In effect, the ROT consumers allow for an increased
consumption response to current income that would not be present with PIH-only
consumers. In the model used by APV the ROT consumer budget constraint in-
cludes a dividend from homeowners to consumers, allowing consumption and labour
supply of ROT consumers to respond to the housing market. As noted by Gal´ı
et al. (2004), ROT consumers provide a fixed supply of labour when their income
is based solely on wages. There is a strong theoretical objection to allowing ROT
consumers to deviate from the behaviour posited by Gal´ı et al. (2004). Not only
does this raise the issue of effectively giving ROT consumers an endowment of hous-
ing which they would have never been able to obtain, it also affects the dynamics of
the model by making ROT consumer behaviour sensitive to the dividend-wage ratio.
Under the APV approach where ROT consumers receive dividends from homeown-
ers, combining ROT consumers’ first order conditions with regard to leisure and the
50
fixed expenditure rule yields
wt
ξ
(1− Lrt ) = wt L
r
t +Dt
⇒ Lrt
[
wt
(
1
ξ
+ 1
)]
=
wt
ξ
+Dt
Lrt
(
1 + ξ
ξ
)
=
1
ξ
−
Dt
wt
Lrt =
1
1 + ξ
−
ξ
1 + ξ
Dt
wt
The second term here is the dividend wedge. The dividend represents income that
is not earnt through labour and thus enables the ROT consumers to reduce the
amount of labour provided but still enjoy the same level of consumption. Thus the
APV result with regard to Lrt depends on the behaviour of the dividend which is
in turn driven by the net worth ratio. This generates an inconsistency in the logic
behind ROT consumers. Even though they do not save, nor can they access the
debt market to fund borrowing to smooth consumption, they are somehow able to
access the mortgage market. Although this produces a richer dynamic response, the
theoretical foundations are questionable. In order to avoid this inconsistency, this
thesis makes ROT consumption dependent only on current income (and taxes in the
fiscal model, see Chapter 3). Thus ROT consumers do not benefit from a higher
dividend. In contrast, PIH consumers, while they receive the higher dividend, do not
change their consumption behaviour on the basis that the shock is seen as temporary.
In order to explore whether the proportion of ROT consumers affect the model
responses, I compare three alternate versions of the model with each version having
a different value for n of 0.31, 0.70 and 0.99, respectively. The possible range of
values that may be taken by n does not encompass the full [0,1] range. This is due
to the assumption that consumers will, in aggregate, provide one-third of their time
as labour to firms in the steady state. Once n drops below approximately 0.31,
PIH consumer labour supply hits a corner solution and the aggregate steady state
labour assumption cannot hold (as this requires a negative supply of labour by PIH
households, n < 0.31 is deemed unfeasible).
Table (2.4) compares selected initial responses of the model under different val-
ues for the proportion of consumers that are PIH with the basic model with the
financial accelerator either switched on or off.
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The pattern of initial responses to an expansionary interest rate shock are simi-
lar across different values of n. The difference columns shows the extent to which
the variable response differs depending upon whether the financial accelerator is
swiched on or not. These differences change little when the the value of n is set to
a minumum of 0.31, 0.7 and 0.99. This indicates that the initial dynamics of the
model are robust to the assumed proportion of ROT consumers.
n = 0.31 n = 0.7 n = 0.99
Variable Basic
model
No FA Diff. Basic
model
No FA Diff. Basic
model
No FA Diff.
Real house price 1.425 0.677 0.748 1.390 0.694 0.695 1.377 0.699 0.679
Net worth∗ 2.026 0.977 1.050 1.969 0.995 0.974 1.950 1.000 0.950
Housing capital∗ 0.016 0.009 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.008 0.006
Investment 3.176 1.777 1.398 2.993 1.692 1.300 2.936 1.666 1.269
Real interest rate -0.215 -0.236 0.021 -0.207 -0.233 0.026 -0.204 -0.231 0.027
Aggregate consumption 0.964 1.053 -0.090 0.710 0.792 -0.082 0.636 0.715 -0.079
Output 0.740 0.786 -0.047 0.596 0.642 -0.047 0.554 0.600 -0.046
Goods consumption 0.738 0.806 -0.069 0.543 0.606 -0.063 0.487 0.547 -0.060
∗Lagged one period
Table 2.4: Comparison of shock period response, financial accelerator on and off
with differing values of n, -25 basis point nominal interest rate shock
2.13.6 Concluding remarks
The basic model displays more muted responses to a nominal interest rate shock, the
result of a depreciation in the real exchange rate prompting an offsetting reaction
by the monetary authority. A similar effect is present following a technology shock
but the difference in the production functions between the closed economy model
and the basic open economy model means drawing conclusions must be done with
a degree of caution.
The significant difference between the closed economy model and the basic (open)
economy model illustrates the importance of the open economy variables given the
impact they have on the impulse response functions. In particular, the real exchange
rate has a significant effect on the output gap.
The introduction of the financial accelerator has a different effect on the model de-
pending on the the shock type. While the model responses are more muted following
a nominal interest rate shock, the responses are stronger for shocks to technology,
52
the foreign real interest rate and foreign demand. The interest rate shock response
is in contrast to the results obtained by APV in which consumption was initially
higher when the financial accelerator is switched on. While in part this result may
be due to the introduction of open economy variables, the key difference is that an
internally consistent allocation of the housing endowment (to PIH households only)
results in a negative financial accelerator effect.
The results from varying the proportion of PIH consumers suggest that the influence
of the financial accelerator is not significantly affected by the extent to which con-
sumers are credit constrained. Under the baseline scenario where 70% of consumers
are assumed to behave in a Ricardian manner, the impact of the financial accelerator
on the response of non-housing variables is relatively unchanged compared to when
31% or 99% of consumers are Ricardian.
The basic model set out out in this chapter is extended further in Chapter 3 to
include an explicit fiscal sector to examine how consumer behaviour and the hous-
ing market are affected by fiscal expenditure and (lump-sum) taxes.
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Chapter 3
The fiscal model
3.1 Introduction
I now extend the basic model by including a specific fiscal authority, hereinafter re-
ferred to as “government”. Intuitively, one would expect that the stimulatory effect
of government spending on the economy would naturally increase the level of eco-
nomic activity, at least in the immediate period of the shock. However, this ignores
the need to fund the spending and the role of taxes (whether current or future) in
determining consumer spending. Mankiw’s (2000) seminal discussion of fiscal policy
in the context of different types of consumers (“savers and spenders”) is particularly
relevant. As noted by Gal´ı, Valle´s and Lo´pez-Salido (2007), discerning the impact
of fiscal policy on consumption is dependent on the (implicit or explicit) nature of
the model used to analyse the economy. Indeed, using the RBC - IS-LM contrast
of Gal´ı et al. (2007), the RBC model would suggest a negative effect of government
spending on the housing market (given that the rise in expected taxes reduces the
present value of after-tax income and thus reduces consumption on goods and hous-
ing) while the IS-LM model would suggest a positive impact on consumption and
house prices.1 As in the basic model, the fiscal model includes a proportion of con-
sumers who are credit constrained (in terms of being able to borrow to fund current
consumption). This combination allows for an element of non-Ricardian behaviour
to influence both consumption and house prices.
1While the standard IS-LM result is for an ambiguous effect on physical capital (output rises
and the income flow from the capital also rises, offset by an increase in the interest rate), the nature
of the housing market is fundamentally different to productive capital stock. While a higher (real)
interest rate would tend to reduce consumption (and thence demand for housing services) it is the
present value of expected future income (net of taxes) that drives consumption and hence demand
for housing.
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The introduction of the fiscal sector has a negligible effect on the behaviour of
the model when responding to non-fiscal shocks. This is because the inclusion of
the fiscal variables requires only changes to a small number of steady state values
but will otherwise not influence the dynamics for non-fiscal shocks given the simple
manner in which both government spending and taxes are modelled. I compare
various settings for n and find little difference in the impulse responses across shock
types.
I examine the impact of fiscal policy on the housing sector by implementing a 1%
shock to government expenditure. The impact on the housing market is unambigu-
ously negative, in line with the RBC responses noted above, but the magnitude is
relatively small. I then examine the extent to which this result is sensitive to the
proportion of consumers who are credit-constrained. A larger proportion of ROT
consumers results in a more pronounced negative impact on the housing market.
3.2 Additional fiscal equations
The government collects lump sum taxes from consumers and purchases consumer
goods. The difference between these two is either funded through the sale of govern-
ment bonds or, where taxes exceed expenditure, is used to retire debt. For simplicity
government expenditure does not impact households directly (typically done in the
literature in the form of a transfer) but rather is a source of final demand for con-
sumer goods (and thence labour demand and imports). Following Gal´ı et al. (2007),
fiscal policy is modelled as the combination of exogenous government spending (Gt),
government debt (BGt ) and lump-sum taxes (Tt) (all in real terms).
The model uses a lump-sum form of taxation. An alternative approach used in
DSGE models is for taxes to be levied on income, e.g. Claus (2005), and would
likely provide different dynamics given that ROT consumers’ labour supply would
be less sensitive to the wage rate (see equation 3.2.6) and fiscal shocks that affect
after-tax income (for example, where taxation is in the form of an income tax) also
affect demand for housing. Although not applicable to the current New Zealand
tax regime, taxation of property may also impact on the behaviour of homeowners
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(i.e. PIH consumers). Neither taxes nor government spending contain automatic
stabiliser elements and are thus unaffected by output.
R−1t+1B
G
t+1 represents the quantum of funds borrowed in period t with B
G
t+1 repaid in
period t+ 1. Hence the government budget constraint may be written:
Tt +R
−1
t+1B
G
t+1 = B
G
t +Gt (3.2.1)
A fiscal rule is also assumed that determines how government purchases are funded,
either via debt or taxation.
Tt − T
T
T
Y
= φB
BGt
Y
+ φG
Gt −G
G
G
Y
(3.2.2)
where φB and φG determine how fiscal imbalances are funded or distributed, and
BG, the steady state government debt level, is assumed to be zero. The fiscal rule
embodies a stability condition so that debt financing does not explode.
In addition to the fiscal equations the inclusion of a fiscal component to the model al-
ters a number of other equations. In particular, ROT consumer utility maximisation
is subject to the following constraint:
Crt = wtL
r
t − (1− n)Tt (3.2.3)
Thus compared to the basic model counterpart of (2.4.4), there is an additional term
−(1−n)Tt that represents the ROT consumers’ share of the lump sum tax to be paid.
The introduction of taxes creates a wedge between the fixed supply of labour that
would normally entail with ROT consumers and the supply of labour in the fiscal
model. This wedge stems directly from the fact that ROT consumers supply labour
over and above the level that would be supplied in the absence of a tax.
As Gal´ı et al. (2007) note, aggregate consumption in the absence of a tax can be
derived in a fashion similar to that used for the basic model first order conditions,
so that:
Ct =
wt
ξ
(1− Lt)
As shown in Appendix D, ROT consumers labour supply in the fiscal model contrasts
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with the basic model equivalent of Equation (2.4.5) in that
Lrt =
1
1 + ξ
+
ξ
wt
(1− n)Tt (3.2.4)
Comparing this with Equation (2.4.5), the fiscal model tax wedge with regard to
labour supply represents the need to work additional hours in order to pay the lump-
sum tax obligations.
Combining (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) with the first order condition for PIH consumers
in the identity for aggregate consumption gives
Ct = (1− n)(wtL
r
t − (1− n)Tt) + n
wt
ξ
(1− Lpt ) (3.2.5)
Adopting Gal´ı et al.’s (2007) terminology, I define λ = (1 − n) = the proportion
consumers who are ROT.
Ct = λ(wtL
r
t − λTt) + (1− λ)
wt
ξ
(1− Lpt )
=
λwt
1 + ξ
+ λξλTt − λ
2Tt +
wt
ξ
(1− λ)−
wt
ξ
(1− λ)Lpt
=
wt
ξ
{
λξ
1 + ξ
+
ξ
wt
ξλ2Tt − λ
ξ
wt
λTt + 1− λ− (1− λ)L
p
t
}
= ξλ2Tt +
wt
ξ
{
1 +
λξ
1 + ξ
−
λ(1 + ξ)
1 + ξ
− λ
ξ
wt
λTt − (1− λ)L
p
t
}
= ξλ2Tt +
wt
ξ
{1− (λLrt + (1− λ)L
p
t )}
= ξλ2Tt +
wt
ξ
(1− Lt) (3.2.6)
It can be seen that the first term (ξλ2Tt) is directly a result of the need to work
extra time to pay for the tax. Hence, the lump sum tax drives a wedge (ξ(1−n)2Tt)
between the usual consumption expression, the second term in Equation (3.2.6), and
aggregate consumption.
The PIH consumer budget constraint (Equation 2.4.7) requires the inclusion of the
lump sum tax term:
CPt +BH,t−1+RStBF,t−1+nTt =
BH,t
(Rt+1)
+
RStBF,t
(Rft+1)ψ (RStBF,t)
+
Wt
Pt
Lpt +Dt (3.2.7)
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However, as the first order conditions with regard to consumption or bond issuance
do not involve Tt, the log-linearised equations derived from the bdget constraint are
the same as the basic model (as outlined in Section 2.4).
The resource constraint is also extended from the basic model to include government
spending so that the fiscal model includes an additional term compared to Equation
(2.3.4) in that
Yt = ct + It +Gt + EXt (3.2.8)
where, Gt is aggregate government consumption of all goods and similar to the
consumer demand for good z, government consumption of consumer good z is given
by
Gt(z) =
(
pt(z)
Pc,t
)
−
Gt (3.2.9)
The fiscal model steady state (for which values for the key variables are shown in
Table 3.1) is derived in the same way as the basic model with two main differences.
The resource constraint now includes a term for government demand for goods (see
Equation F.1.1) and ROT consumption is derived from (3.2.3) by simply dropping
the time subscripts. The difference in the steady state values between the fiscal
and basic models can be traced back to the presence of government spending in the
steady state. From Equation (F.1.1) it can be seen that G
Y
would increase the steady
state output. However, via the production function, the steady state output is also
a function of technology, imports as a proportion of output and aggregate labour
supply - none of which change between the two models. Thus the steady state out-
put must be the same. Given that government spending increases Y in Equation
(F.1.1), another variable must serve to keep Y constant. This is effectively done by
a decrease in q.
The basic model log-linear equations are modified with equations (3.2.10) and (3.2.11)
replacing (2.9.9) and (2.9.4), respectively, augmented by equations (3.2.12), (3.2.13)
and (3.2.14). The derivation of the log-linear equations that change from the basic
to the fiscal model is given in Appendix D.
Cˆrt =
wLr
Cr
(wˆt + Lˆ
r
t )−
(1− n)T
Cr
Tˆt (3.2.10)
59
Yˆt =
c
Y
cˆt +
I
Y
Iˆt +
G
Y
Gˆt +
EX
Y
EˆX t (3.2.11)
Lˆrt =
ξ(1− n)T
wLr
(Tˆt − wˆt) (3.2.12)
dBGt+1
Y
= R
[
dBGt
Y
+
G
Y
(Gˆt − Tˆt)
]
(3.2.13)
Tˆt =
(
G
Y
)
−1
φB
BGt
Y
+ φGGˆt (3.2.14)
Variable Description Fiscal model Basic model
q Real house price 5.0356 5.9382
h Housing stock 0.5 0.5
Rh Return on housing 1.0166 1.0166
Xc Relative price of consumption good 1.6826 1.6187
Xh Relative price of renting 0.1088 0.1283
I Housing investment 0.0025 0.0025
N Net worth 1.7625 2.0784
D Housing dividend 0.0293 0.0345
C Aggregate consumption 0.2863 0.3376
Y Real output 0.2271 0.2271
w Real wage 0.5592 0.5592
IM Imports 0.0640 0.0640
EX Exports 0.0556 0.0556
EX −RS IM Current account -0.0084 -0.0084
c Goods consumption 0.1378 0.1690
Lr ROT labour supply 0.4521 0.4740
Lp PIH labour supply 0.2777 0.2683
Cr ROT consumption 0.2435 0.2651
Cp PIH consumption 0.3047 0.3687
Table 3.1: Fiscal model steady state values
Parameter Description Value
σA Innovation variance of technology shock (0.18%)
2
σi Innovation variance of nominal interest rate shock (0.14%)
2
σrf Innovation variance of foreign real interest rate shock (0.20%)
2
σyf Innovation variance of foreign demand shock (0.67%)
2
σg Innovation variance of fiscal spending shock (1.3%)
2
Table 3.2: Innovation variances
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3.3 Parameterisation of the fiscal model
In order to assist comparison between the variants of the model, the paramterization
is kept as similar as possible. Thus the deep structural parameters, such as η, α
and γ have the same value in the basic model as the fiscal model. The variances of
the model variables depend in part on the nature of the assumed shock processes.
Estimates of the actual volatility in the empirical counterparts of the shock variables
are set out in Table 3.2.
Calibration of the fiscal model was carried out with the objective of minimising
the difference between empirically estimated variances of a number of variables and
the variances generated by the model. The model moments and the empirically
observed counterparts are set out in Table 3.3. In particular, real house prices, resi-
dential investment and output were the key variables used to gauge the closeness of
the moments. As noted in Chapter 2, the moments were adjusted by way of chang-
ing the values of a number of deep structural parameters, namely the sensitivity of
the premium to the net worth ratio (Ω), the sensitivity of the housing dividend to
the net worth ratio (χ
′(φ)
χ(φ)
φ), the inverse of the sensitivity of the investment-housing
stock ratio to the replacement cost ratio for housing (Γd) and export sensitivity to
both the real exchange rate (ϑ) and foreign demand (ζ). The data used to estimate
the empirical values are described in Appendix B.
Adjustment of the structural parameters used to alter the model’s moments of-
ten resulted in divergent effects. Thus it was necessary to prioritise which moments
should be matched first. Given that the primary focus is on the housing market,
these were used as the primary moments to match with adjustment to change other
moments only done if it did not adversely effect the housing market moments. Thus
while the fiscal DSGE model provides a close match in terms of the housing market
moments (real house prices, net worth and residential investment), its ability to
match the real exchange rate, export and import data is less close. DSGE models
with sticky prices are well known to underestimate the degree of volatility in real
exchange rates (see Ahmad, Lo and Mykhaylova, 2011). This would naturally tend
to result in an underprediction of exports and imports given their relationship with
the real exchange rate. In addition, this thesis has abstracted from shocks to for-
eign price levels which would clearly have implications for the volatility of the real
exchange rate.
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Variable Description Data Fiscal model
q Real house prices 4.54% 4.62%
N Net worth 6.65% 6.63%
Rn Nominal interest rate 0.31% 0.21%
pi Overall inflation 0.57% 1.01%
S Nominal exchange rate 5.51% 2.61%
RS Real exchange rate 6.26% 0.61%
C Aggregate consumption 1.48% 2.09%
I Residential investment 9.83% 9.79%
Y Output 2.08% 1.09%
EX Exports* 5.89% 1.03%
IM Imports* 6.81% 2.67%
∗Proxied by debits and credits in the current account
Table 3.3: Fiscal model moment matching
As the fiscal model is more comprehensive than the basic model and thus should be
a better representation of the New Zealand economy, it is useful to compare the pa-
rameterisation of the fiscal model with other New Zealand calibrated DSGE models.
Table 3.4 includes parameters taken from other New Zealand calibrated DSGE mod-
els, being the KITT model employed by the RBNZ (Benesˇ et al., 2009), Claus (2005)
and Liu (2006). Each model differs from the one used in this thesis in a variety of
aspects and so that means the comparison must be made with a degree of caution.
Arguably, KITT is the closest to this thesis’ model in that it explicitly includes
a housing sector and a financial accelerator but is significantly more detailed with
inter alia an explicit role for capital and industry subcomponents. Neither Claus
(2005) nor Liu (2006) include an explicit housing sector. Imports enter into Liu’s
model as competing consumption goods, whereas they are intermediate imports in
Claus.
3.4 Government spending shock
The impulse responses to a positive 1% shock to government spending are shown in
Figure 3.1.
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Variable Description Fiscal model KITT Claus Liu Comment
φ Net worth ratio 0.70 0.70 n/a n/a
β Discount rate 0.99 0.9975 0.9902 0.99
f(φ) Steady state premium fac-
tor
1.0064 0 n/a n/a Quarterly premium
α Weight on imports in pro-
duction function
0.2 0.34 0.36 n/a KITT uses Cobb-Douglas
production function.
γ Substitutability parame-
ter in production function
-0.2 n/a -0.1 n/a
δ Depreciation rate 0.005 0.01 0.0213 n/a Claus depreciation applies
to capital.
EX/Y Exports/Output ratio 0.245 0.3032 0.31 n/a KITT uses Y=GDP
IM/Y Imports/Output ratio 0.282 0.2796 0.33 n/a
G/Y Government spend-
ing/Output ratio
0.137 0.2453 0.12 n/a
θ Price resetting parameter 0.75 n/a 0.66 0.75 1−θ = Probability of firm
resetting price
Ω Sensitivity of spread to
net worth
-0.1 -0.049 n/a n/a
ϑ Elasticity of exports to
real exchange rate
1 0.1065 1 0.85 KITT value = 1/(adj.
cost for manufacted ex-
ports)
ζ Elasticity of exports to
foreign demand
1 0.1065 1 1
Table 3.4: Parameters from NZ-calibrated DSGE models
The increase in demand from higher government expenditure necessitates a pos-
itive output response and thus a higher wage in order to induce greater labour
supply from households. The increase in output results in an increase in the output
gap, eliciting a tightening response from the monetary authority, lifting both the
nominal and real interest rates. It should be noted that the increase in the output
gap is significantly smaller than the increase in output. The reason for this is that
the increase in the real interest rate causes an appreciation of the real exchange
rate (depicted by a decline in the real exchange rate chart) which in turn reduces
the cost of the intermediate imports. Thus for a given cost amount, firms are able
to produce more and the flexible price output level increases. At the same time
the appreciation in the real exchange rate dampens export demand for domestically
produced goods, offsetting some of the original increase in demand from the govern-
ment spending shock. Consequently the increase in the output gap is less than the
increase in output but is still positive.
The higher real interest rate dampens PIH consumption but by less than the pickup
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in ROT consumption. Aggregate consumption rises in the shock period above the
steady state, resulting in an increase in the relative price of rental and a decrease in
the relative price of consumption goods. With the reduction in the replacement cost
of housing, house prices fall, acting as a disincentive to invest in housing. The drop
in the real house price leads to a reduction in the net worth of households carried
through into the following period and thus a reduction in the dividend as well.
The impact of a positive government spending shock on the housing market is clearly
negative. This contrasts with the effect of an expansionary nominal interest rate
shock. Thus, stimulatory shocks have different impacts on the housing market de-
pending on their origin. I note also that the effect of a government spending shock
has opposing impacts on the housing market and consumption, unlike the typically
observed house price-consumption empirical correlation. Given that the magnitude
of the impulse response functions is also relatively muted compared to the responses
to the technology, nominal interest rate and foreign interest rate shocks, the impli-
cation is that government spending shocks do not dominate other shocks.2
2Results of the fiscal model response to technology, real foreign interest rate and foreign demand
shocks are available on request.
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Figure 3.1: Response to a 1% government spending shock
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Figure 3.1: Response to a 1% government spending shock (continued)
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Figure 3.1: Response to a 1% government spending shock (continued)
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Figure 3.1: Response to a 1% government spending shock (continued)
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Figure 3.1: Response to a 1% government spending shock (continued)
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Figure 3.1: Response to a 1% government spending shock (continued)
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3.5 Comparison of fiscal model with basic model
The fiscal model impulse responses to a monetary policy shock are shown in Figure
3.2. The responses are very similar to the basic model. Given that for an interest
rate shock (or any other non-fiscal shock), the fiscal variables (government spend-
ing, lump-sum taxation and government debt issuance) will not shift significantly
from their steady state values, the impulse response functions of the fiscal model
should be similar to those in the basic model. Recall that the steady state has been
calculated in order to obtain an aggregate labour utilisation rate of 0.33. Because
of this, most aggregate level steady state values are similar across the two model
types. Hence the high degree of similarity between the fiscal and basic model im-
pulse response functions.
Unsurprisingly, the major differences in model response relate to the presence of
the tax wedge. This is most obvious when looking at the ROT labour response. In
the basic model ROT labour supply is constant as shown in section 3.2. The tax
wedge term in Equation (3.2.6) shows that there is an inverse relationship between
ROT labour supply and the real wage. As the wage rises, ROT consumers need
supply less labour to meet their tax obligation and thus work fewer hours. Hence,
for as long as the wage is above its steady state, ROT consumers will supply labour
below their steady state level. This reduction in ROT labour outweighs the PIH
labour response and as a result the aggregate labour response in the fiscal model is
smaller than that of the basic model. This also results in smaller magnitude output
and import responses in the fiscal model relative to the basic model.
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal model comparison - Response to a 0.25% nominal interest rate
shock
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal model comparison - Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal model comparison - Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal model comparison - Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.2: Fiscal model comparison - Response to a -0.25% nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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3.6 Sensitivity analysis - Changing the propor-
tion of ROT consumers
In this section, I examine how changes to the assumed proportion of the ROT con-
sumers, 1− n, affect the model dynamics.
Given that the steady state is largely determined by the aggregate consumption
behaviour (rather than the PIH and ROT consumer behaviours individually), the
steady states are similar across the range of values for n used, the only difference
being the allocation of consumption and labour supply between the two consumer
types.
As n increases (i.e. the proportion of consumers who are ROT declines), the vari-
ables of the fiscal model become less sensitive to interest rate shocks (Figure 3.3).
A smaller proportion of the the lump sum tax is borne by ROT consumers and thus
for a given wage increase there is a smaller response in ROT labour supply.
However, as the proportion of consumers that are PIH increases, the representative
PIH consumer need supply less labour. Similarly, as n increases, the income of PIH
consumers rises (for a given wage increase) and although they increase consumption,
their smoothing behaviour means that rather than increasing consumption signific
antly they reduce their borrowing.
A similar effect is noticable when examining the IRF’s to a government spend-
ing shock for various values of n, as depicted in Figure 3.4. Again, the model shows
generally greater sensitivity to the fiscal spending shock when n is low, reflecting
the greater sensitivity of aggregate consumption to income as n declines. As with
the interest rate shock, a lower value for n gives rise to a bigger reaction (in the case
of a positive government spending shock, a negative reaction) in the housing market.
However, I note that the impact of the government spending shock is relatively
small in comparison to the interest rate shock. A 0.25% nominal interest rate shock
gives rise to significantly larger impulse responses than a 1% government spending
shock. The implication is that if the model were subject to a variety of different
shocks, the response to a fiscal shock would quickly become lost in the presence of
nominal interest rate shocks.
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity to n - Response to a -25 basis point nominal interest rate
shock
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity to n - Response to a -25 basis point nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity to n - Response to a -25 basis point nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity to n - Response to a -25 basis point nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity to n - Response to a -25 basis point nominal interest rate
shock (continued)
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity to n - Response to a 1% government spending shock
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity to n - Response to a 1% government spending shock (contin-
ued)
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity to n - Response to a 1% government spending shock (contin-
ued)
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity to n - Response to a 1% government spending shock (contin-
ued)
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity to n - Response to a 1% government spending shock (contin-
ued)
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3.7 Concluding comments
Given the relatively muted response of the model to fiscal shocks, the housing mar-
ket is more likely to reflect other shocks. Most other shock types have significantly
larger responses than the fiscal shock. This result is still applicable when the pro-
portion of ROT consumers is increased (to a maximum of 69%). Thus fiscal policy
is not supportive of the housing market. In turn, this suggests that although the
housing market underwent a boom during most of the 2000s, this was despite rather
than because of an expansionary fiscal policy.
In addition, the model behaviour suggests that the nominal interest rate is likely
to be the most influential shock of the five shock types considered, particularly for
the housing market. However, given that the financial accelerator effect is relatively
muted (as demonstrated in Chapter 2), the need for the central bank to take into
account the potential impact of the housing market on other economic variables
would be similarly fairly low.
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Chapter 4
Examining the financial
accelerator using an SVAR
4.1 Introduction
Given the theoretical basis for a financial accelerator effect on the housing market
set out in Chapters 2 and 3, the natural question that arises is whether this effect is
empirically visible. This chapter sets out a structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
model which includes both the spread (between the mortgage interest rate and the
risk-free interest rate) and household consumption. The financial accelerator con-
cept embodies the view that an improvement in the net worth of households (relative
to the value of the housing stock) reduces the riskiness of the mortgagee and thus
enables a lower mortgage interest rate relative to the benchmark (risk-free) inter-
est rate. In turn, this change in spread would influence the cost of debt servicing
and thence disposable income. Thus in the presence of a financial accelerator an
increase in the net worth of households should reduce the spread and in turn enable
an increase in household consumption. This should result in a negative correlation
between the spread and consumption expenditure.
Most econometric studies of housing markets have not focused on the financial ac-
celerator. Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) use the spread and real house prices in a
VECM aimed at examining the credit channel of monetary policy but do not look
at consumption per se. Sutton (2002) looks at the determinants of house prices in
the context of a VAR rather than the effect of house price shocks. Bjørnland and
Jacobsen (2008, 2010) use house prices in a VAR that examines the role for housing
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in the transmission of monetary policy but do not focus on the specific transmission
channels such as interest-sensitive expenditure. Elbourne (2007) provides a sum-
mary of several studies that include house prices and consumption but of these only
Iacoviello and Minetti include a spread variable.
4.2 Variable selection
The choice of variables included in the VAR is driven by the need to recognise the
small open economy nature of New Zealand and incorporation of various aspects of
the housing market. In particular, the demand for New Zealand’s exports is cap-
tured by a world growth variable relevant to New Zealand. The relative price at
which New Zealand trades in goods and services, the terms of trade, is also included.
More specifically, the terms of trade is measured as the quantity of imported goods
that can be funded through a given quantity of exports both on a NZ dollar basis.
A rising terms of trade could be indicative of either a higher return for exporters
(potentially coupled with a rising demand) or decreasing cost for New Zealand to
import, especially its intermediate imports, or a combination of both. Given that
economic activity is a key consideration for the state of the housing market, New
Zealand’s gross domestic product (GDP) is a key variable to include. Moreover, this
allows for the “common cause” interpretation of consumption growth.
Given the primary focus on the financial accelerator, the obvious variable to include
is the spread between the mortgage rate and the benchmark government interest
rate. As the theoretical underpinning of the financial accelerator is the value of the
stock of housing, house prices are also included. Finally, household consumption is
included as the ultimate variable of interest.
I also include a government spending variable. A secondary issue in this thesis is
whether government spending influences the housing market. As noted in Chapter
3, when government expenditure is modelled with explicit financing (debt or taxes)
and a no-ponzi condition, shocks to government spending negatively impact the
housing market. Moreover, if government spending has a direct impact on house-
hold consumption, including this may assist in estimation of the effect of the spread.
Clearly, this set of variables is not exhaustive and there are numerous other vari-
ables that could be included. Econometric limitations aside (see below), the initial
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analysis considered using in addition to or replacing some of the above variables
with net worth, a short-term interest rate and the real exchange rate.
Net worth did not appear to provide any significant improvement in model results
over and above house prices. Indeed, looking at the graphs of both net worth and
house prices (Figure 4.1), there is an apparent correlation with major changes in
growth occurring at similar times and with apparent similar magnitudes. This sug-
gests that the debt component of net worth is relatively constant, given that net
worth is defined as the value of the housing stock less indebtedness.
Figure 4.1: Real house prices and net worth
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While short-term interest rates are typically included (especially with RBC-based
approaches), I exclude it on the basis that it a) reduced the degrees of freedom in
a relatively short sample period and b) it appeared to add little over and above
the spread. Finally, the initial analysis was done using an exchange rate variable
but this was dropped in favour of the terms of trade. The reason behind this was
because the real exchange rate is arguably one-step further removed from the do-
mestic economy. In the model set out in Chapters 2 and 3 the real exchange rate
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variables determine the price of intermediate imports which is more in-line with the
definition of the terms of trade, making the terms of trade the more appropriate
empirical counterpart to be used in the SVAR. The terms of trade is based on New
Zealand dollar prices and could thus be viewed as the combination of global tradable
prices in foreign currency and the exchange rate.
The seven variables of interest are: world GDP (WGDP), the terms of trade (TOT),
government spending (GOV), household consumption (HH), New Zealand gross do-
mestic product (GDP), house prices (RHPI) and the spread between the mortage
interest rate and the risk-free interest rate (SPREAD). WGDP is a weighted average
of GDP for economies that are relevant to New Zealand. TOT is the terms of trade
as calculated by Statistics New Zealand. HH, GOV, and GDP are the household
consumption, government consumption and gross domestic product components of
expenditure-based GDP as calculated by Statistics New Zealand. SPREAD is the
difference between the 90-day Treasury bill rate and the RBNZ’s Variable First
Home Mortgage rate. The variables are shown in their log level forms in Figure
4.2. The next step is to examine the series with a view to determining whether
any transformation of the data is needed. In VAR models, this typically begin with
an investigation into the possible presence of unit roots. Following Buckle, Kim,
Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma (2007), I use a Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend
the data. The detrended data is presented in Figure (4.3). The use of an HP filter,
like any filter, is not without possible drawbacks. Where data should not be filtered
but has a filter applied, spurious cycles may be introduced (discussed in Cogley and
Nason, 1995). Thus in order to check that spurious cycles have not influenced the
subsequent results, the following SVAR model was also estimated using the raw data
with no material difference in results observed.
The sample period runs from 1988Q2 to 2008Q3. Data before 1988 was not avail-
able on a consistent basis due to changes in statistical series or simply an absence of
data. 2008 was used as cut off as later data was likely to be significantly affected by
the global financial crisis and thus reflect changes in a number of deep institutional
parameters.
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Figure 4.2: Variables in log levels
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Figure 4.3: Variables detrended
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4.3 Unit root testing
The typical approach to VAR modelling, once variable selection has been done, is
to examine each series for a possible unit root. As outlined in Enders (2004), where
variables are stationary (i.e. no unit root is present) classical regression models may
be applied without further manipulation of the data. However, when unit roots
are present, the residuals obtained from each equation estimated using classical re-
gression are not stationary and thus it is not possible to draw inferences or test
hypotheses. The task then becomes one of identifying which variables contain unit
roots and the appropriate treatment.
I use the method set out in Enders (2004), modified from Dolado, Jenkinson and
Sosvilla-Rivero (1990), in which each series is modelled according to the following
structure:
∆yt = a0 + a2t+ γyt−1 +
p∑
i=1
βi∆yt−i + et (4.3.1)
The process tests the various components in order, modifying the test equation ac-
cordingly until a conclusion regarding the presence of a unit root is reached. Starting
from the general equation, the process initially tests for whether gamma is zero. If
this cannot be rejected, the next couple of steps check whether this result is due to
the presence of a trend or a constant. Once the presence of a unit root is accepted,
the order of integration is determined by the number of times the data must be
differenced in order to reject the presence of a unit root. Enders summarises the
process as reproduced in Figure 4.4.
The key test statistics for each variable are summarised in Table 4.1. The aug-
mented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) is predicated on the number of lags (p) assumed
in the process. There are a number of ways identifying the appropriate number of
lags. Methods such as the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) are
commonly used. I supplement this with a sequence of pare-down tests in which the
regression equation is estimated with a declining number of lags, starting with 11
lags. This naturally has a tendency to select a high number of lags. The t-statistic
for the coefficient on the longest is examined for significance and if none is found
the number of lags is reduced and the regression re-estimated. The appropriateness
of the selected value for p is also tested by examining the residual from the ADF
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Figure 4.4: Enders (2004), p. 213, modified unit root testing procedure
97
regression using the Ljung-Box Q-statistic.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
ττ τµ τ Φ3 Φ1 Order
LWGDP -4.053 ** -4.052 *** -4.086 *** 8.708 ** 8.251 *** 0
LTOT -5.298 *** -5.197 *** -5.229 *** 14.039 *** 13.503 *** 0
LGDP -2.667 -2.723 * -2.750 *** 3.817 3.761 0
LGOV -6.186 *** -6.225 *** -6.263 *** 19.152 *** 34.501 *** 0
LRHPI -3.338 * -3.441 * -3.447 *** 5.925 * 6.229 ** 0
SPREAD -4.972 *** -5.006 *** -5.036 *** 12.508 *** 12.536 *** 0
LHH -3.326 * -3.403 ** -3.408 *** 5.704 * 6.033 ** 0
Phillips-Perron
ττ τµ τ Φ3 Φ1 Order
LWGDP -3.609 ** -3.664 *** -3.676 *** 6.128 * 4.722 * 0
LTOT -4.273 *** -4.291 *** -4.319 *** 8.305 ** 8.337 *** 0
LGDP -3.397 * -3.436 ** -3.467 *** 5.862 * 5.920 ** 0
LGOV -6.188 *** -6.227 *** -6.266 *** 19.152 *** 34.501 *** 0
LRHPI -1.697 -1.779 -1.811 * 1.351 0.427 1
SPREAD -5.204 *** -5.227 *** -5.253 *** 12.508 *** 12.536 *** 0
LHH -2.563 -2.614 * -2.641 *** 1.217 3.385 0
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Signficant at 1% level
Italics indicate test unnecessary to reach conclusion
Table 4.1: Unit root test results - Detrended data
Given that ADF tests have a bias toward rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root
in the presence of structural breaks, I also use the Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistic.
This abstracts from the assumed lag structure. The same process of testing is used
with the PP test statistic.
The Enders unit root testing process resulted in rejection of the null of unit root
for all variables regardless of whether the ADF or PP test was used with the one
exception of real house prices. The ADF tests rejected a unit root but the PP failed
to reject the null for LRHPI HP. Given that this is the only series to indicate the
presence of a unit root, there are two possible treatments. The first is to difference
the HP-filtered series and then include this transformed series in the VAR. The sec-
ond is to rely on the ADF tests and treat LRHPI HP as stationary. Both versions
were used as alternates in the SVAR and little difference to the results was found.
Thus in order preserve consistency, the following analysis is based on the use of
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LRHPI HP.
Given the presence of a cointegrating vector for the data in level form (see below),
this raises the question of the appropriate treatment of the data. One possible
approach is to difference the data so as to make them stationary. However, as
Lutkepohl (2005) notes:
“. . . a VAR process with cointegrated variables does not admit a pure
VAR representation in first differences.”
Given that the log-deviations from trend are a close approximation to the percent-
age change for small changes, it is likely that detrending may well be subject to the
same criticism.
Because most of the data would be I(1), it would then be necessary to test for coin-
tegration. Typically data that is suspected of being cointegrated would be subject
to further tests such as the Engle-Granger or Johansen tests. However, standard
econometrics software assume that the variables are all endogenous or if exogenous
only appear as current levels as opposed to lagged values (such as dummy vari-
ables). Because LWGDP is not endogenous, the standard application of a Johansen
test is not appropriate. Boswijk and Doornik (2005) present an alternative method
to estimate the distribution for the likelihood ratio used in the cointegration tests.
Unfortunately, this is not accommodated in EViews.
The exogeneity of LWGDP not only causes problems for the cointegration test but
also for the specification of the VAR itself. If some of the variables were coin-
tegrated (and it would be reasonable to believe that at least some of the above
selected variables would be), the appropriate framework to utilise is that of a Vector
Error Correction Model (VECM). While based on the VAR formulation, the lagged
variables are in difference form, in addition to one period lagged levels. However, as
with the standard VAR formulation, the introduction of an exogenous series, such as
LWGDP, means that conventional estimation software cannot be used to estimate
the VECM.
Given the above issues, the detrending of the data provides a more tractable basis
for estimating the VAR. Although detrending may well cause a loss of information,
the primary focus here is on the impulse responses and thus the long-run relation-
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ships (embodied in the levels matrix contained in a VECM) are less relevant.
4.4 Levels data
4.4.1 Unit root testing
As is typically found with economic data, most of the series are I(1). World GDP
is the only variable that clearly rejects the presence of a unit root. The terms of
trade, government spending and the spread are all unambiguously I(1).
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
ττ τµ τ Φ3 Φ1 Order
LWGDP -3.7251 ** -0.8354 4.0979 7.1617 ** 9.1371 *** 0
LTOT -1.4600 -0.8337 1.6083 -31.8913 4.6243 1
LGDP -2.5987 0.2101 4.9789 3.5687 0.0070 1
LGOV -1.0653 1.9026 5.1023 2.9773 14.9967 *** 1
LRHPI -3.3838 -1.6253 0.7502 5.8201 1.5367 1
SPREAD -2.5419 -2.1953 -0.3789 3.2565 2.4122 1
LHH -2.8874 0.8837 3.5721 5.2887 6.3064 ** 1
Phillips-Perron test results
ττ τµ τ Φ3 Φ1 Order
LWGDP -3.7254 ** -1.6532 13.0439 8.2849 ** 4.6243 *** 0
LTOT -1.8652 -1.1536 1.5186 -31.8913 0.3422 1
LGDP 3.5687 0.0070 5.1265 3.5687 0.0070 1
LGOV -1.3958 2.8086 5.9978 2.6697 0.5187 1
LRHPI -1.9164 0.0704 2.1953 2.4342 0.2125 1
SPREAD -3.5191 ** -2.8981 ** -1.0609 6.3379 *** -3.8826 0
LHH -2.3944 0.9044 5.3874 4.1369 0.4689 1
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Signficant at 1% level
Italics indicate test unnecessary to reach conclusion
Table 4.2: Unit root test results - Levels data
The Akaike and Schwarz criteria give conflicting results for the appropriate number
of lags to be used in testing house prices. Regardless of the number of lags used,
the Enders process results in the conclusion that there is a unit root in house prices.
Although the Ljung-Box statistics show greater statistical significance for the resid-
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uals when p=1, they remain below the 5% threshold. In order to facilitate the later
analysis, I treat house prices as I(1).
Two other variables display behaviour that is dependant on the number of lags used
in the ADF testing. I have identified New Zealand GDP as I(1) based on a com-
bination of PP testing of the differenced series, a selection of 0 lags using SIC and
the relatively low significance values for the lagged coefficients when estimated with
six lags. The alternative, suggested by the AIC and pare-down procedure, is for 6
lags - which seems excessive and not in keeping with other VAR models. Although
household consumption shows relatively low significance for the lagged coefficients
when p=2 (SIC selection) compared to p=5 (AIC selection), the use of 5 lags leads
to a conclusion that there is no unit root. This is in contrast to the PP testing
which concludes that there is a unit root. Furthermore, the Ljung-Box Q-statistics
suggest that p=2 generates a residual series that is closer to white noise than p=5.
Thus I assume that household consumption is I(1).
4.4.2 Cointegration
The above results give one I(0) series and six I(1) series. This raises the issue of how
to adequately deal with variables of mixed degrees of integration. In order for clas-
sical regression to be applicable, the I(1) series must be cointegrated so that their
combination is stationary. With six I(1) series, there is a large number of potential
cointegrating relationships. For example, there could be three different cointegrating
relationships between two variables each, two relationships betwen three variables
each or two relationships between two and four variables. This makes the Engle-
Granger approach of testing specific combinations impractical.
The Johansen method gives an alternative to the Engle-Granger method for iden-
tifying the number of cointegrating relationships. The Johansen method estimates
the rank of the estimated matrix (Π) to test the null hypothesis that the number of
distinct cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to a given value, r. It should be
noted that the Johansen method is also dependent upon the assumption of whether
an intercept or trend is present in the data. While it would appear that there are
trends in the log level data, the cointegration test uses differenced data and thus
as Enders notes a trend should only be incorporated in the cointegration test when
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there is a clear economic rationale for its inclusion.
The above univariate ADF tests suggest that LWGDP is I(0) and need not be dif-
ferenced. That said, given that LWGDP is likely to be exogenous with regard to
the New Zealand data, using a standard VAR where the coefficients of the LWGDP
equation with respect to the New Zealand data would not be assumed to be zero may
result in estimated non-zero coefficients where none should exist. Although EViews
can incorporate exogenous variables, their treatment is analagous to dummy vari-
ables, where they appear only as current explanatory variables in the form of:
yt = A1yt−1 + A2yt−2 + · · ·+ Apyt−p +Bxt + et (4.4.1)
where B is the matrix of coefficients for the exogenous variables, xt. Thus it does
not allow for past values of the exogenous variable to influence current endogenous
variables.
As a result, using the standard Johansen methodology to test for cointegration in
the presence of an exogenous lagged variable is somewhat problematic. One alterna-
tive is to apply a Johansen test to the domestic variables only with the international
variables (LWGDP HP and LTOT HP) and their lags appearing as exogenous series,
noting that this then removes the possibility of a relationship between the interna-
tional variables.1 This issue would also occur when specifying a VECM given the
related need to set both the long-run and short-run relationships so that the exoge-
nous variable has zero coefficients with regard to the New Zealand data and also
appears with a lag in the equations for the New Zealand variables.
Given the above issues with using a VECM with levels data, detrending and using a
VAR approach obviates the need to apply non-standard processes such as Boswijk
and Doornik (2005). Brady and Stimel (2011) note the difficulties associated with
non-stationarity and cointegration and the use of VECMs and opt for use of log-
level data. Given this lack of clarity in the literature as to which is the appropriate
method, the detrended model estimated in Section 4.8 was also run using log-level
data and no material differences in the results were found.
1Adopting this approach, EViews suggests that there are four cointegrating relations.
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4.5 Lag length selection
Estimation of a VAR is based on an assumed number of lags. In order to ascertain
the appropriate number of lags the AIC, SIC, and likelihood (LR) tests are em-
ployed. The two criteria choose very different lag lengths with the SIC selecting 1
lag only and the AIC selecting 6 (the maximum number of lags tested). The LR test
consecutively tests the null hypothesis that the lag length is p against the alternate
that p is of a larger specified value. The results of the lag length tests are shown in
Table 4.3. The null is repeatedly rejected until testing H0 : p = 1 verus H1 : p = 2,
implying that the lag length should be set to 2.
The SIC is known to perform better with small samples (see Ivanov and Kilian,
2005) . However, when the actual lag length exceeds the maximum number of lags
examined, the AIC is known to pick a better approximatation of the true data
generating process. Given that the LR testing process also picks a relatively low
number of lags, it seems more probable that the appropriate lag length for the model
is relatively low. Thus I set the lag length to 2. Rerunning the model with 4 lags
(not reported) does not result in significantly different results.
Lag selection criteria values
Criteria p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 6
AIC -4500 -4533 -4516 -4509 -4589*
SIC -4383* -4316 -4199 -4092 -3972
* Indicates selected lag length
Likelihood Ratio test
H0 : p = 1 H0 : p = 2 H0 : p = 3 H0 : p = 4
H1 : p = 2 H1 : p = 3 H1 : p = 4 H1 : p = 6
χ2 80.94 41.08 39.87 78.81
Significance 0.0048 0.8381 0.8701 0.9571
Table 4.3: Lag length selection criteria and LR test
4.6 Identification
It is likely that at least some of the variables are affected contemporaneously by
other variables. Hence, the underlying relationships are of the form:
βxt = Γ0 + Γ1xt−1 + Γ2xt−2 + · · ·+ Γpxt−p + εt (4.6.1)
103
Premultiplying by β−1
xt = β
−1Γ0 + β
−1Γ1xt−1 + β
−1Γ2xt−2 + · · ·+ β
−1Γpxt−p + β
−1εt (4.6.2)
which is equivalent to the standard form VAR
xt = A0 + A1xt−1 + · · ·+ Apxt−p + et (4.6.3)
In order to achieve identification (n2 − n)/2 restrictions must be imposed. I use a
standard Choleski factorisation of β to allow for exact identification, where
β =


1 0 0 . . . 0
β21 1 0 ... 0
β31 β32 1 . . . 0
...
β71 β72 β73 . . . 1


(4.6.4)
SVARs typically involve forms of restrictions other than a Choleski factorisation,
including coefficinet restictions, variance restrictions and symmetry restrictions. As
the SVAR used here is not intended to be a representation of a theoretical model,
I have not attempted to use specific restrictions on individual elements of β. It
should also be noted that additional restrictions may also have a cost in terms of
the degrees of freedom which given the relatively short time series available may
lead to a loss in efficiency.
4.7 Ordering
The Choleski factorisation lends itself well to the fact that LWGDP HP is exoge-
nous, as the imposed zeroes are equivalent to saying that LWGDP HP is unaffected
by contemporaneous values of all other variables. The ordering of variables in a
Choleski factorisation is important given that it determines the extent to which the
estimated error terms are affected by the underlying shocks and thence the variance-
covariance matrix. As noted, it is reasonable to order LWGDP HP first. Given the
extent to which the prices of New Zealand’s tradable goods are driven by offshore
events, it is also reasonable to put the terms of trade variable second (and thus
unaffected by New Zealand domestic events). There are three non-housing domes-
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tic activity variables: GDP, household consumption and government expenditure.
Arguably, current government spending is not determined by the current level of
activity or private sector spending. Thus LGOV HP appears ahead of the other
two in the ordering. Buckle et al. order domestic demand ahead of GDP. While
there is no particularly strong reason for doing this, I similarly order the demand
variable (household consumption) ahead of output (GDP). Reversing this to put
GDP ahead of household consumption does not change the model output in any
significant manner. The housing market variables are next with the financial ac-
celerator implying that the spread should follow house prices (as the driver of net
worth).
Thus the ordering is as follows: LWGDP HP, LTOT HP, LGOV HP, LHH HP,
LGDP HP, LRHPI HP and SPREAD HP.
4.8 Estimation
As noted above, the inclusion of an exogenous variable with lagged values means
that the standard VAR approach to modelling is not applicable. Instead, I use
Seemingly Unrelated Regression, a process also used by Buckle et al. (2007). This
allows me to specify that the exogenous LWGDP HP equation is dependent only
upon its past history and not on any of the NZ data. It also allows lagged values
of LWGDP HP to appear in the equations for the New Zealand variables. Thus a
series of equations are defined with LWGDP HP depending only on its past history.
Other equations include LWGDP HP and its lags as an explanatory variable. In
this regard, the VAR approach used here includes a relatively modest amount of
structure over and above the standard VAR methodology.
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4.9 SVAR equations
LWGDP HPt = A01 +
2∑
i=1
A11i LWGDP HPt−i + e1t
LTOT HPt = A02 +
2∑
i=1
A21i LWGDP HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A22i LTOT HPt−i + e2t
LGOV HPt = A03 +
2∑
i=1
A31i LWGDP HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A32i LTOT HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A33i LGOV HPt−1 + e3t
LHH HPt = A04 +
2∑
i=1
A41i LWGDP HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A42i LTOT HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A43i LGOV HPt−1 +
2∑
i=1
A44i LHH HPt−i + e4t
LGDP HPt = A05 +
2∑
i=1
A51i LWGDP HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A52i LTOT HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A53i LGOV HPt−1 +
2∑
i=1
A54i LHH HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A55i LGDP HPt−i + e5t
LRHPI HPt = A06 +
2∑
i=1
A61i LWGDP HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A62i LTOT HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A63i LGOV HPt−1 +
2∑
i=1
A64i LHH HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A65i LGDP HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A66i LRHPI HPt−i + e6t
SPREAD HPt = A07 +
2∑
i=1
A71i LWGDP HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A72i LTOT HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A73i LGOV HPt−1 +
2∑
i=1
A74i LHH HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A75i LGDP HPt−i
+
2∑
i=1
A76i LRHPI HPt−i +
2∑
i=1
A77i SPREAD HPt−i + e7t (4.9.1)
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where Akli represents the element at the row k column l of matrix Ai consistent with
Equation (4.6.3).
The resulting equations are grouped and OLS used to estimate the variance-covariance
matrix of the residuals. Combined with the restrictions above, the remaining ele-
ments of β can be identified using maximum likelihood (by way of the CVMODEL
command in RATS). Unfortunately, this means that standard errors for the impulse
responses cannot be directly calculated. The standard errors to the impulse response
functions are created by bootstrapping. The observed residuals to the SVAR are
randomly shuffled and β is re-estimated and then in turn a new impulse response
function for each variable is also created. This is repeated 1000 times and from this
the standard deviation of the impulse response functions is calculated.
4.10 Impulse response functions
Figures (4.5a) and (4.5b) contain the impulse response functions for positive one
standard deviation shocks to the spread and real house prices, respectively.
Contrary to the financial accelerator theory, a positive shock to house prices does
not reduce the spread. The theory of the financial accelerator says that a posi-
tive shock to the ratio of net worth to housing value should reduce the riskiness of
mortgage debt and thus reduce the spread between mortgage interest rates and the
benchmark risk-free rate. However, the initial response of the spread is an unam-
biguous increase. The spread declines and by the fourth period after the shock is
not significantly different from zero.
I note that the way in which the financial accelerator is modelled in Chapters 2
and 3 concentrates on the ratio of net worth (in essence the equity of houseowners)
to the value of the housing stock. This is not identical to house prices. However,
net worth and house prices are very closely correlated (the cross-correlation of house
prices with net worth is around 0.93, see also Figure 4.1) suggesting that the housing
stock and debt change relatively slowly compared to prices. In turn, this implies
that house prices are the primary driver of net worth. In order to check this, the
model was rerun with the net worth ratio instead of real house prices (results avail-
able on request) and the impulse responses to a shock to the net worth ratio was
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similar to the response to a real house price shock.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse response functions
(a) Spread shock impulse response function
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(b) Real house price shock impulse response function
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Figure 4.5: Impulse response functions (continued)
(c) Government spending shock impulse response function
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One possible explanation is that the source of the house price shock is important in
determining the spread response. The models set out in Chapters 2 and 3 do not
incorporate speculative bubbles, with house prices determined by a Tobin’s q-type
relationship. However, an increase in net worth generated by a speculative bubble
in house prices may not be viewed as sustainable and therefore not decreasing the
credit risk associated with mortgage lending.
Alternatively, the nature in which mortgages are funded may have a significant
impact on their pricing. Given the large proportion of bank funding in New Zealand
that originates from overseas rather than domestic savings, the spread may be de-
termined more by long-term swap rates rather than considerations of credit risk.
Indeed, the volatility of New Zealand Dollar swap rates, through which offshore
funding is priced, is considerably higher than that of the IMF’s New Zealand Dollar
bank prime rate. The small and open (especially with regard to capital flows) nature
of the New Zealand economy means that there is both a relatively small domestic
pool of funds available for mortgage lending and a rapid pass-through from the in-
ternationalised swap markets to domestic mortgage rates.
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At the same time, the positive house price shock is associated with a positive house-
hold consumption response. Household expenditure is unambiguously positive in its
response to a positive house price shock and the remains clearly so for two years. At
first blush this would appear to support the general concept of a wealth effect, al-
though as noted in Chapter 1, the exact theoretical underpinning is less convincing.
Indeed, this positive consumption response does not rule out the possibility that
a “common cause” is at work, serving to stimulate both house prices and house-
hold consumption at the same time. It should be noted that the IRFs do not in
themselves say that households do not respond to the spread but that rather if the
spread does have an effect on household spending, there appears to be another more
significant mechanism that works in the same direction as the house price shock.
An interesting result is the response of government spending to the (positive) house
price shock. This may reflect a strengthening of government revenues concurrent
with (but not necessarily linked to) a rising housing market, allowing for an expan-
sion of government spending.
The impulse responses to a spread shock provides only weak support for the view
that there is a financial accelerator effect. In the period immediately following the
positive shock the response by household consumption is unambiguously positive.
This clearly contradicts the theory behind the accelerator as a wider spread should
result in a decline in consumption. However, the initial positive household consump-
tion response is reversed immediately and the median response is almost entirely
negative thereafter. The error bands suggest that from the third quarter onwards,
any impact on household consumption is not significant.
A shock to government spending has practically no significant impact on the housing
market variables (see Figure 4.5c). Both the house price and spread error bands are
mostly centred around the zero line. The spread does appear to have an initially
negative reaction. The median responses for both these variables are initially nega-
tive with the spread moving into mildly positive territory over roughly the second
year but this ebbs away while the house price response converges to zero from below.
Although not significant, this tendency for a negative reaction is consistent with the
model presented in Chapter 3 where government spending had a negative impact
on the housing market.
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4.11 Variance decomposition
The variance decompostions for household consumption are given in Table 4.4a.
The most striking feature here is that aside from its own innovations, variability
in household consumption is attributable more to house price shocks rather than
shocks to the broad activity measure of GDP. After two quarters (the first in which
household consumption may respond to house prices by design) shocks to house
prices account for 21 percent of household consumption movement. This is in sharp
contrast to the 2 percent attributable to GDP shocks. By the fifth quarter, house
price shocks explains over twice as much of the variability in consumption as for
GDP. As with the IRFs, while this underscores the correlation between household
consumption and house prices, it does not automatically follow that there is a causal
relationship. Given that the linkage with general activity - as measured by GDP -
is of a lesser magnitude, one might argue that this does not support the “common
cause” view of the house price-consumption relationship, particularly if one believes
that expectations are strongly influenced by recent experience. That said, where a
common cause is not tied to aggregate activity, the common cause view may still be
valid.
Little of the movement in household consumption can be attributed to shocks to
the spread. Less than 2 percent of the variation in household consumption may be
explained by changes to the spread. By the second year following the shock, the
spread contributes less than government spending shocks. A shock to the spread
would likely have a small effect on spending given that when translated into dollars,
a 50 basis point change to the mortgage interest rate would be relatively small in
comparison to changes in other factors that impact on consumption (such as con-
sumer prices). The small influence of government spending shocks is consistent with
the view that households take into account the implied future tax implications.
The variance decomposition of the spread variable (Table 4.4c) suggests that house
price shocks have at least as much effect on the spread as consumption and GDP
individually. While this points to house prices being relatively important in terms
of their contribution to spread variability, the magnitude is modest, beginning at 7
percent and falling to 5 percent. As noted above, if the spread is more influenced by
funding costs than the net worth of households then the persistently high weight on
its own innovations and the significant influence of shocks from the external econ-
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omy (particularly world GDP) are unsurprising.
House price variability (Table 4.4b) stems mainly from a combination of its own
shocks, world GDP, household consumption and New Zealand GDP. Government
spending shocks have an even smaller contribution to house price variability than
they do to consumption which suggests that stimulatory fiscal policy is not a source
of house price growth. This underscores the insignificant response of house prices
to a positive government spending shock.
Step Std Error LWGDP HP LTOT HP LGOV HP LHH HP LGDP HP LRHPI HP SPREAD HP
1 0.006446 0.985 3.463 2.382 93.170 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.008380 1.284 2.275 1.631 71.244 1.550 20.942 1.074
3 0.009996 1.564 1.976 1.195 57.119 5.798 30.492 1.856
4 0.011476 1.233 1.822 1.025 48.471 10.992 34.981 1.475
5 0.012844 1.697 1.648 0.861 41.810 15.516 37.290 1.178
6 0.014057 4.044 1.496 0.796 37.479 18.113 37.087 0.984
7 0.015196 8.046 1.415 0.784 34.185 19.310 35.411 0.849
8 0.016211 12.577 1.394 0.765 31.517 19.706 33.295 0.746
12 0.018326 22.426 1.841 0.729 26.560 19.832 27.873 0.738
16 0.018655 23.416 2.384 0.721 25.703 19.844 26.983 0.949
20 0.018737 23.254 2.523 0.715 25.641 19.699 27.140 1.027
(a) Variance decomposition for LHH HP
Step Std Error LWGDP HP LTOT HP LGOV HP LHH HP LGDP HP LRHPI HP SPREAD HP
1 0.012623 11.127 0.741 0.233 11.352 4.027 72.521 0.000
2 0.021518 11.923 0.387 0.200 9.102 6.526 71.833 0.030
3 0.028697 8.473 0.766 0.207 10.388 11.480 68.343 0.343
4 0.034817 5.862 1.027 0.186 12.117 15.029 64.860 0.919
5 0.040206 6.760 1.031 0.228 13.853 16.789 60.201 1.139
6 0.045215 10.462 0.872 0.296 15.017 17.445 54.737 1.172
7 0.049695 15.108 0.722 0.340 15.437 17.646 49.692 1.055
8 0.053414 19.229 0.653 0.369 15.454 17.762 45.614 0.919
12 0.060889 26.734 1.106 0.406 14.553 18.578 37.792 0.832
16 0.062282 27.744 1.699 0.414 14.069 18.848 36.211 1.014
20 0.062543 27.612 1.893 0.412 14.051 18.732 36.192 1.107
(b) Variance decomposition for LRHPI HP
Step Std Error LWGDP HP LTOT HP LGOV HP LHH HP LGDP HP LRHPI HP SPREAD HP
1 0.228966 7.925 1.195 1.380 0.139 1.019 7.085 81.257
2 0.257993 12.286 5.208 1.528 0.303 3.036 6.895 70.743
3 0.276242 10.824 7.199 2.510 3.577 5.437 6.031 64.422
4 0.283758 10.959 7.995 2.436 4.500 5.876 5.766 62.468
5 0.291234 14.215 8.249 2.328 4.581 5.812 5.478 59.337
6 0.299935 18.712 7.937 2.203 4.523 5.500 5.167 55.958
7 0.305763 21.609 7.658 2.146 4.394 5.303 5.042 53.846
8 0.308620 22.889 7.519 2.114 4.339 5.233 5.041 52.865
12 0.311110 23.314 7.402 2.086 4.432 5.358 5.379 52.030
16 0.313204 23.939 7.312 2.063 4.472 5.442 5.436 51.338
20 0.313518 23.997 7.314 2.060 4.476 5.480 5.434 51.240
(c) Variance decomposition for SPREAD HP
Table 4.4: Variance decomposition
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4.12 Concluding comments
Overall, there is little evidence from the empirical data that there is a financial
accelerator effect in New Zealand. It is possible that a financial accelerator effect
exists in that, all other things constant, a change in the net worth of households
would influence the spread but if there are other influences on the mortgage rate
(such as funding costs) that have a bigger impact, the linkage from house prices (via
the net worth ratio) to the spread may well be swamped. In addition, the data does
not clearly support a linkage from the spread to consumption. That said, the im-
pulse responses and variance decomposition results point to a significant correlation
between house prices and spending. In other words, despite the apparent lack of a
financial accelerator there remains evidence of a high level “wealth effect”.
The inclusion of government spending allows for examination in part of whether
fiscal policy has an influence on house prices. The median IRFs suggest that govern-
ment spending has a negative impact on both the housing market and consumption
but as with the financial accelerator, the impact is not significant.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and potential future
research
5.1 The DSGE models
The financial accelerator has been posited as a mechanism through which the value
of housing might influence consumption expenditure. This thesis incorporates a fi-
nancial accelerator into a DSGE model with an explicit housing sector. It builds on
work by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe
(2002). The model extends the preceding work by opening the economy to inter-
national trade in goods and capital. For a small open economy like New Zealand’s,
incorporating such elements is essential in order to capture key economic drivers
and their impact on the housing market.
The exchange rate and international trade and capital flows are key adjustment
mechanisms that impact on the housing market and the manner in which it adjusts.
In comparison to the closed economy models of BGG and APV, the incorporation of
the exchange rate moderates the response to a nominal interest rate shock, result-
ing in smaller and shorter responses by both the housing market and non-housing
market variables.
In contrast to the earlier literature, I find that the financial accelerator, while am-
plifying the effect of a nominal interest rate shock on the housing market, dampens
the response of non-housing market variables. Following an unexpected reduction
in the nominal interest rate, the model with the financial accelerator switched on
116
displays a smaller decline in the real interest rate compared to the model without
the financial accelerator. Thus the stimulatory effect is moderated. A similar result
occurs when comparing the responses of the basic model and the model with the fi-
nancial accelerator switched off, to technology, real foreign interest rate, and foreign
demand shocks.
I extend the basic open economy model further by including an explicit fiscal sector.
Government spending is financed by a combination of lump-sum taxes and govern-
ment debt. The split between these two is determined by the fiscal rule. The fiscal
authority faces a budget constraint that equates spending (on goods and debt repay-
ment including interest) with income (taxes and the funds from new debt issuance).
I find that government spending has a modestly positive impact on aggregate con-
sumption in the baseline model but this impact varies depending on the proportion
of ROT consumers assumed. For example, even when PIH consumers make up only
31 percent of consumers, household consumption reacts positively to government
spending shocks but when this is increased to 99 percent the reaction is negative.
In contrast, the impact of a government spending shock on the housing market is
negative regardless of the proportion of consumers that are PIH, with a negative
reaction across house prices, housing capital, investment, the dividend and the rel-
ative price of rent. The size of the fiscal model responses to government spending
shocks suggests that were the model to be subjected to a variety of shocks over time,
the impact of the government spending shocks would be hard to discern.
5.2 The SVAR
In Chapter 4 I examine the New Zealand data using a Structural Vector Auto Re-
gression (SVAR) model. I find that data provides no support for the contention
that there is a financial accelerator. Indeed, the impulse responses of the spread
between the mortgage rate and the benchmark (risk-free) interest rate react in the
opposite manner to that suggested by the DSGE models of Chapter 2 and 3. Simi-
larly, the variance decomposition of movement in the spread attributes only a small
proportion to house price shocks. It is possible that in reality the mortgage rate is
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determined by a number of other factors, including funding costs, and the linkage
between house prices and the spread is too weak to be apparent. This suggests that
including other variables that capture these funding costs may be necessary in order
to estimate the impact of house prices or net worth on the spread.
The spread may have a small effect on household spending. Whereas the DSGE
model suggests that a positive shock to the spread should dampen consumption,
the IRFs from a shock to the spread initially indicate a rise in consumption. This is
quickly reversed and, subject to the fairly wide standard error bands, consumption
is slightly below the trend over the remainder of the five-year horizon used. Thus
although the response of consumption over time appears to be consistent with the
models of the earlier chapters, it is not significant enough for one to conclude that
empirically the spread does impact on consumption. Combined with the variance
decomposition data, which also show that little of the movement in consumption
can be atributed to shocks to the spread, the SVAR provides only weak evidence for
the existence of a financial accelerator effect.
Consistent with the results from the DSGE models, the SVAR suggests that gov-
ernment spending does not have a significant sustained effect on the housing market
or even household consumption. The IRF’s of house prices and consumption do not
deviate significantly from zero in terms of their response to a government spending
shock and little of their movement is attributed to government spending shocks. I
note that apart from an initially positive response of household consumption to a
government spending shock, the median responses of both house prices and house-
hold consumption are negative, albeit not significantly so. The negative responses
are also consistent with the responses of the DSGE model in Chapter 4.
The econometric data does confirm the widely observed correlation between house
prices and consumption. This thesis has shown that a DSGE model of the New
Zealand economy exhibits the correlation of consumption with house prices despite
the absence of a direct wealth effect. Moreover, this result is still present in the ab-
sence of a financial accelerator. Although this does not disprove that a wealth effect
exists, the models in Chapters 2 and 3, supported by the evidence of Chapter 4,
are consistent with a “common cause” view of the housing-consumption relationship.
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5.3 Future research
There are a number of avenues for further work, six of which I suggest below.
The widespread empirical relationship between house prices and consumption has
been used by proponents of the wealth effect as the reason for positing a direct
relationship between the two. This is embodied in this thesis by way of the dividend
from homeowners to consumers. However, the behavioural equations behind this
should be based more firmly on microeconomic theory. One way of doing this, as
noted by Buiter (2008) is to introduce into the DSGE models a “bubble” element
in house prices that reflects a degree of myopia.
Second, in Chapters 2 and 3 the behaviour of the homeowner component of the
household is based on equilibrium relations rather than an explicit maximisation
problem. This does not quantify the impact of rental income on homeowners, which
may be useful given that PIH households are not just owner-occupiers but also land-
lords (to the ROT renters). Thus there is scope to expand the model to explicitly
describe the behaviour of the homeowners and the associated budget constraint in-
corporating rental income from ROT consumers.
Third, Stillman and Mare´ (2008) find that immigration, particularly that due to
returning New Zealanders, has a significant impact on house prices. The DSGE
model in this thesis is framed in terms of representative agents and thus abstracts
from demographic factors (e.g. population growth, migration). Thus the housing
capital variable is equivalent to the housing stock per capita. One possible way to
represent population shocks is to examine the impact of a negative shock to the
housing stock.
Fourth, the models set out in Chapters 2 and 3 do not explicitly model the be-
haviour of financial intermediaries or their funding costs. The addition of an explicit
financial intermediary sector (see, for example, Claus, 2005) would allow for a more
rigorous treatment of funding costs. While this is captured to some extent by the De
Paoli (2009) approach to setting the domestic interest rate as a function of foreign
debt, a more developed treatment of financial intermediaries may further strengthen
the effect of foreign interest rates on the domestic housing market.
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Fifth, government spending reflects, in part, the fiscal stance of the Government.
The model presented in Chapter 3 is relatively simple with taxation set on a lump-
sum basis. This approach is consistent with DSGE models developed by a number
of central banks (see, for example, Dib et al., 2008,). However, there is scope for fur-
ther development of the fiscal sector. Possible avenues for extension include labour
and consumption taxes, transfers and automatic stabilizers (e.g. Zubairy, 2010).
Such extensions would partly endogenise tax rates and spending, and potentially
result in a richer dynamic response to the various shocks.
Finally, in Chapter 4 the terms of trade has been assumed to be dependent on
the domestic economy on a lagged basis but dependent only on world GDP on a
contemporary basis. Evans and Wells (1982) suggest that exogeneity is more jus-
tifiable when the terms of trade is calculated on a foreign currency basis. As the
Statistics New Zealand series is calculated on a New Zealand dollar basis, there is
likely to be a degree of endogeneity. One possible approach would be to replace
the current terms of trade series with a foreign currency terms of trade series and
a separate exchange rate variable although the addition of another variable to the
SVAR may also lead to insufficient observations.
While the literature on financial accelerators, and particularly their relevance to
the housing market, has developed in recent years, the empirical evidence is not
strongly supportive at least in the context of the New Zealand data. Given the
increasing focus on housing as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy and
other shocks, further research in this area is necessary in order to determine the
extent to which the housing market does indeed amplify or instead simply reflect
macroeconomic shocks.
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Figure A.1: Response to a 1% technology shock, basic model with and without the
financial accelerator
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Figure A.1: Response to a 1% technology shock, basic model with and without the
financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.1: Response to a 1% technology shock, basic model with and without the
financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.1: Response to a 1% technology shock, basic model with and without the
financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.1: Response to a 1% technology shock, basic model with and without the
financial accelerator (continued)
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Marginal cost                 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Wage                          
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Exports                       
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Imports                       
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Output                        
Quarters (shock in t=1)
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
Output gap                    
Quarters (shock in t=1)
 
 
Basic model No accelerator
132
Figure A.2: Response to a 25 basis point foreign real interest rate shock, basic model
with and without the financial accelerator
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Figure A.2: Response to a 25 basis point foreign real interest rate shock, basic model
with and without the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.2: Response to a 25 basis point foreign real interest rate shock, basic model
with and without the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.2: Response to a 25 basis point foreign real interest rate shock, basic model
with and without the financial accelerator (continued)
0 5 10 15 20
−3
−2
−1
0
ROT consumption               
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
PIH consumption               
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
ROT labour                    
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
PIH labour                    
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Labour                        
Quarters (shock in t=1)
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
 
 
Basic model No accelerator
136
Figure A.2: Response to a 25 basis point foreign real interest rate shock, basic model
with and without the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.3: Response to a 1 % foreign demand shock, basic model with and without
the financial accelerator
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Figure A.3: Response to a 1 % foreign demand shock, basic model with and without
the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.3: Response to a 1 % foreign demand shock, basic model with and without
the financial accelerator (continued)
0 5 10 15 20
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 Relative price of cons good   
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Relative price of rental      
0 5 10 15 20
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Aggregate consumption         
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Goods consumption             
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Real foreign currency debt/C  
Quarters (shock in t=1)
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e
 
 
Basic model No accelerator
140
Figure A.3: Response to a 1 % foreign demand shock, basic model with and without
the financial accelerator (continued)
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Figure A.3: Response to a 1 % foreign demand shock, basic model with and without
the financial accelerator (continued)
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Appendix B
Data description
The data used in this thesis are quarterly observations, that being the frequency of
most macroeconomic data series published by Statistics New Zealand. The interest
rate series are generated by averaging monthly data. Where possible, the data cov-
ers the period from 1988Q1 to 2008Q3. The net worth ratio is calculated using the
RBNZ’s ‘Total Household Claims’ data and thus starts in 1990Q4.
The moments used to calibrate the fiscal model of Chapter 3 (Table 3.3) are derived
from HP-filtered data. House prices are from the All Residential HPI published by
the RBNZ. This series is based primarily on QVNZ data with earlier observations
estimated by the RBNZ. It is deflated by the CPI to obtain a real house price series.
Net worth is derived from the RBNZ’s aggregate private sector dwellings values less
total household credit and deflated by the CPI. Consumption, output and residen-
tial investment are from data from the RBNZ (derived from Statistics New Zealand
data). The real exchange rate data is the RBNZ’s real Trade Weighted Index.
The data used in the SVAR of Chapter 4 are seasonally adjusted unless other-
wise specified before logging. The world GDP series was obtained directly from the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) and represents aggregate growth for New
Zealand’s trading partners. There is no discernible seasonality in the raw data and
thus it was not seasonally adjusted. The terms of trade data is repesented by season-
ally unadjusted Statistics New Zealand’s Terms of Trade Index (Table Reference:
OTP019AA), expressed in logs. New Zealand GDP and household consumption
data were obtained from the RBNZ due to the relatively short history of the official
Statistics New Zealand data. The RBNZ series are based on Statistics New Zealand’s
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chain-linked constant price expenditure-based measures. Government expenditure
is represented by Statistics New Zealand’s chain-linked constant price expenditure-
based measure (Table reference: SNC062AA). Real house prices were obtained by
deflating the RBNZ/Quotable Value nominal house price index by Statistic New
Zealand’s Consumer Price Index. The spread between the mortgage rate and the
risk-free interest rate is calculated as the difference between the RBNZ’s Variable
First Home Mortgage rate and the IMF’s New Zealand 90-day Treasury Bill rate,
both on an annual basis and seasonally unadjusted. Net worth is represented by the
difference between the RBNZ/Quotable Value Aggregate Private Sector Dwelling
Value and the RBNZ’s Total Household Claims. The data used in the SVAR is
available on request.
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Appendix C
Derivation of log-linear equations:
Basic model
In the the following description and derivation of the various model equations, a hat
indicates percentage change. As the linearisation is around the steady state the hat
variables are equivalent to percentage deviations from the steady state.
C.1 Firms
Consumer goods producing firms are monopolistically competitive and use a com-
bination of labour and imported intermediate goods as inputs by way of a CES
production function:
yt(z) = [αIMt(z)
γ + (1− α)(AtLt(z))
γ]
1
γ (C.1.1)
where IMt(z) is the quantity of intermediate imports used by firm z, Lt(z) is simi-
larly labour demand, At is economywide labour-augmenting technology and
1
1−γ
is
the elasticity of substitution between labour and imports.
Log linearising and aggregating across all firms
log Yt = log[αIM
γ
t + (1− α)(AtLt)
γ ]
1
γ
Yˆt =
1
Yt
1
γ
Y 1−γt [αIM
γ
t
ˆIM t + (1− α)(AtLt)
γ(Aˆt − Lˆt)]
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which around the steady state reduces to
Yˆt = ϕ ˆIM t + (1− ϕ)(Aˆt − Lˆt) (C.1.2)
where
ϕ =
αIMγ
αIMγ + (1− α)(AL)γ
C.2 Input demand determination
The cost minimisation problem for the firm may be written as:
L = WtLt + (St P
f
t )IMt + λt(yt − [αIM
γ
t + (1− α)(AtLt)
γ]
1
γ ) (C.2.1)
Differentiating this with respect to Lt and IMt yields:
d L
d Lt
= Wt − λt
1
γ
[αIMγt + (1− α)(AtLt)
γ]
1
γ
−1(1− α)γ(AtLt)
γ−1At
= Wt − λt y
1−γ
t (1− α)(AtLt)
γ−1At
= Wt − λt(1− α)At
{ yt
(AtLt)
}1−γ
λt =
Wt
(1− α)Aγt
{
yt
Lt
}1−γ (C.2.2)
and
d L
d IMt
= (St P
f
t )− λt
1
γ
[αIMγt + (1− α)(AtLt)
γ]
1
γ
−1αγIMγ−1t
= (St P
f
t )− λtα
{ yt
IMt
}1−γ
λt =
St P
f
t
α
{
yt
IMt
}1−γ (C.2.3)
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Hence
Wt
(1− α)Aγt
{
yt
Lt
}1−γ = (St P ft )
α
{
yt
IMt
}1−γ
wt
RSt
=
(1− α)Aγt
{
yt
Lt
}1−γ
α
{
yt
IMt
}1−γ
The yt’s also cancel and this may be expressed as:
(IMt
Lt
)1−γ
Aγt =
α
1− α
wt
RSt
(C.2.4)
Log-linearising
(1− γ)(log IMt − logLt) + γ logAt = logα− log(1− α) + logwt − logRSt
(1− γ)
(
dIMt
IMt
−
dLt
Lt
)
+ γ
dAt
At
=
dwt
wt
−
dRSt
RSt
(1− γ)( ˆIM t − Lˆt) + γAˆt = wˆt − RˆSt
ˆIM t =
(
1
1− γ
)
(wˆt − RˆSt − γAˆt) + Lˆt (C.2.5)
C.3 Marginal cost
From the production function, note that
( yt
Lt
)γ
=
αIMγt + (1− α)(AtLt)
γ
Lγt
= α
(IMt
Lt
)γ
+ (1− α)Aγt
yt
Lt
=
[
α
(IMt
Lt
)γ
+ (1− α)Aγt
] 1
γ
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Log linearising the marginal cost Equation (C.2.2)
λt =
Wt
(1− α)Aγt
{
yt
Lt
}1−γ
log
λt
Pc,t
= log
Wt
Pc,t
− log (1− α)− γ logAt − (1− γ) log
yt
Lt
logmct = logwt − log (1− α)− γ logAt −
1− γ
γ
log
(
α
(IMt
Lt
)γ
+ (1− α)Aγt
)
(C.3.1)
Differentiating the last element of Equation(C.3.1)
d
[
α
(IMt
Lt
)γ
+ (1− α)Aγt
]
= αγ
(IMt
Lt
)γ−1(LtdIMt − IMtdLt
L2t
)
+ (1− α)γAγ−1t dAt
= αγ
(IMt
Lt
)γ(dIMt Lt
IMt Lt
−
IMt
Lt
Lt
IMt
dLt
Lt
)
+ (1− α)γAtγ
dAt
At
= αγ
(IMt
Lt
)γ
( ˆIM t − Lˆt) + (1− α)γA
γ
t Aˆt
Notice we can re-express ϕ as
ϕ =
α
(
IM
L
)γ
α
(
IM
L
)γ
+ (1− α)Aγ
Then
d log
(
α
(IMt
Lt
)γ
+ (1− α)Aγt
)
= ϕ( ˆIM t − Lˆt) + (1− ϕ)Aˆt
and
mˆct = wˆt − γAˆt − (1− γ)[ϕ( ˆIM t − Lˆt) + (1− ϕ)Aˆt]
= wˆt − (1− γ)ϕ( ˆIM t − Lˆt)− [(1− γ)(1− ϕ) + γ]Aˆt (C.3.2)
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C.4 Resource constraint
Output from firms is consumed by domestic consumers, foreign consumers or utilised
in the production of housing:
Yt = ct + It + EXt
dYt
Yt
=
ct
Yt
dct
ct
+
It
Yt
dIt
It
+
EXt
Yt
dEXt
EXt
Yˆt =
ct
Yt
cˆt +
It
Yt
Iˆt +
EXt
Yt
EˆX t
Dropping the time subscripts for the levels variables because of the steady state
Yˆt =
c
Y
cˆt +
I
Y
Iˆt +
EX
Y
EˆX t (C.4.1)
where ct is domestic consumption of consumption goods, It is investment in housing
and EXt is consumption goods exported to foreign consumers.
C.5 Export demand
Foreign demand for firm z’s output is given by
EXt(z) =
(
S−1t Pt(z)
S−1t Pc,t
)−
EXt
=
(
Pt(z)
Pc,t
)
−
EXt (C.5.1)
As per McCallum and Nelson (1999), I assume that aggregate export demand is
given by
EXt =
(
StP
f
t
Pt
)ϑ
(Y ft )
ζ (C.5.2)
EˆX t = ϑRˆSt + ζYˆ
f
t (C.5.3)
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C.6 Prices
The composite price index combines the prices of consumption goods and rental in
the following manner:
Pt = [νP
1−η
c,t + (1− ν)P
1−η
h,t ]
1
1−η (C.6.1)
Taking differences
0 = ν(1− η)X−ηc,t dXc,t + (1− ν)(1− η)X
−η
h,t dXh,t (C.6.2)
=
dXc,t
Xc,t
ν(1− η)X1−ηc,t + (1− ν)(1− η)
dXh,t
Xh,t
X1−ηh,t (C.6.3)
= Xˆc,t +
(
1− ν
ν
)(
Xh
Xc
)1−η
Xˆh,t (C.6.4)
C.7 Households
PIH consumers maximise their utility over time with the intra-period utility given
by
logCPt + ξlog(1− L
P
t )
where CPt represents PIH consumers cobined consumption of goods and housing
services and LPt represents the labour supplied by PIH consumers.
Standard Dixit-Stiglitz assumptions on utility and demand lead to consumer j’s
demand for aggregated consumption goods in the form
cjt =
[∫ 1
0
cjt(z)
−1
 dz
] 
−1
where
cjt(z) =
(
pt(z)
Pc,t
)
−
cjt
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and aggregating across all consumers leads to
ct = υ
(
Pc,t
Pt
)
−η
Ct
= υX−ηc,t Ct
log ct = log υ − η logXc,t + logCt
cˆt = Cˆt − ηXˆc,t (C.7.1)
and
ht = (1− υ)
(
Ph,t
Pt
)
−η
Ct
= (1− υ)X−ηh,t Ct
log ht = log(1− υ)− η logXh,t + logCt
hˆt = Cˆt − ηXˆh,t (C.7.2)
C.7.1 PIH consumers’ first order conditions
Each period consumers face a budget constraint. Each period consumers may pur-
chase or sell financial assets either domestically or abroad. Following De Paoli (2009)
(but expressed in real terms) the budget constraint is:
CPt +BH,t−1 +RStBF,t−1 =
BH,t
(Rt+1)
+
RStBF,t
(Rft+1)ψ (RStBF,t)
+
Wt
Pt
Lpt +Dt
where BH,t−1 is the amount of real domestic currency bonds purchased (BH,t−1 < 0)
or issued (BH,t−1 > 0) at time t− 1 with maturity t, BF,t−1 is similarly real foreign
currency denominated bonds, RSt is the real exchange rate, Rt+1 the real domestic
interest rate from period t to t + 1, Rft+1 is similarly the foreign interest rate, and
Dt is the dividend paid by homeowners to consumers.
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The maximisation problem is:
L =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEt
{
logCPs + ξlog(1− L
P
s )
+ λs[C
P
s + BH,s−1 +RSsBF,s−1
−
BH,s
Rs+1
−
RSsBF,s
(Rfs )ψ (RSsBF,t)
−
Ws
Pc,s
Ls −Ds]
} (C.7.3)
Hence maximising with respect to CPs :
∂L
∂CPs
= βs−t(
1
CPs
+ λs)
Setting to zero,
βs−t(
1
CPs
+ λs) = 0
⇒ λt = −
1
CPt
(C.7.4)
Maximising with respect to BH,s:
∂L
∂BH,s
= −βs−tλs
1
Rs+1
+ βs−t+1Etλs+1
Setting to zero,
βs−tλs
1
Rs+1
− βs−t+1Etλs+1 = 0
⇒ λt = Rt+1βEtλt+1
Substituting (C.7.4) into this yields:
1
CPt
= βRt+1Et
1
CPt+1
(C.7.5)
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Log-linearising
log
1
CPt
= log β + logRt+1 + logEt
1
CPt+1
− logCPt = log β + logRt+1 − logEtC
P
t+1
dCPt
CPt
= Et
dCPt+1
CPt+1
−
dRt+1
Rt+1
CˆPt = EtCˆ
P
t+1 − Rˆt+1 (C.7.6)
Maximising with respect to BF,s:
∂L
∂BF,s
= −βs−tλs
RSs
(Rfs+1) ψ(RSsBF,s)
+ βs−t+1Esλs+1RSs+1
Setting to zero,
λsRSs
Rfs+1ψ(RSsBF,s)
= βEt(λs+1RSs+1)
Substituting (C.7.4) into this yields:
1
CPt
= Rft+1ψ(RStBF,t)βEt
(
1
CPt+1
RSt+1
RSt
)
(C.7.7)
Substituting (C.7.5) into this yields:
βRt+1Et
1
CPt+1
= Rft+1ψ(RStBF,t)Et
[
1
CPt+1
RSt+1
RSt
]
⇒ βRt+1 = R
f
t+1ψ(RStBF,t)Et
RSt+1
RSt
Rˆt+1 = Rˆ
f
t+1 − δbbˆt + Et(RˆSt+1 − RˆSt) (C.7.8)
where
bˆt =
(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
− b
)
1
C
δb = −ψ
′C
b = steady state level of foreign currency debt.
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C.7.2 Wage determination
Maximising (C.7.3) wrt labour
∂L
∂LPs
= βs−t
[
ξ
1− LPs
(−1)− λs
Ws
Pc,s
]
= 0
Substituting in (C.7.4)
1
CPt
=
ξ
wt(1− LPt )
ξCPt = wt(1− L
P
t )
log ξ + logCPt = logwt + log(1− L
P
t )
dCPt
CPt
=
dwt
wt
−
LPt
1− LPt
dLPt
LPt
CˆPt = wˆt −
LP
1− LP
LˆPt (C.7.9)
where wt is the real wage.
C.7.3 Rule of thumb first order conditions
Rule of thumb consumers maximise utility of
logCrt + ξ log(1− L
r
t )
subject to
wtL
r
t = C
r
t
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Thus combining the first order conditions with respect to consumption and labour
for ROT consumers gives
wt L
r
t =
wt
ξ
(1− Lrt ) (C.7.10)
⇒ Lrt =
1
ξ
−
Lrt
ξ
⇒ Lrt
(
1 + ξ
ξ
)
=
1
ξ
⇒ Lrt =
1
1 + ξ
⇒ Lˆrt = 0 (C.7.11)
In other words, labour supply by ROT consumers is fixed and thus Lˆrt can be dropped
from the log-linear model. Consequently, changes to the aggregate labour supply
are driven only by changes in PIH labour supply.
Lt = nL
p
t + (1− n)L
r
t
dLt = ndL
p
t + (1− n)dL
r
t
dLt
L
=
nLp
L
dLpt
Lp
+ (1− n)
nLr
L
dLrt
Lr
Lˆt = nLLˆ
p
t + (1− n)Lˆ
r
t
Lˆt = nLLˆ
p
t (C.7.12)
where nL =
nLp
L
.
As a result, ROT consumption is derived as follows:
Crt = wtL
r
t
dCrt = wtdL
r
t + Ltdwt
Cˆrt =
wLr
Cr
wˆt (C.7.13)
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C.8 Aggregate consumption definition
Aggregate consumption is the weighted consumption of PIH and ROT consumers
Ct = nC
P
t + (n− 1)C
r
t
dCt = n dC
P
t + (n− 1) dC
r
t
dCt
Ct
=
nCPt
Ct
dCPt
CPt
+
(1− n)Crt
Ct
dCrt
Crt
Re-expressing the second element of the RHS of the above equation
=
nCPt
Ct
dCPt
CPt
+
(1− n)
(1− n)
Ct − nC
P
t
Ct
dCrt
Crt
Cˆt = npCˆ
P
t +
C − nCP
C
Cˆrt
= nCCˆ
P
t + (1− nC)Cˆ
r
t (C.8.1)
where nC = n
CP
C
C.9 The mortgage - risk-free interest rate relation
In keeping with BGG, the cost of borrowing for the purchase of housing capital is
at a premium to the risk-free interest rate, this premium varying inversely with the
extent that the borrower has net positive wealth. Because of the agency problem
outlined in BBG, mortgage lenders will only lend to homeowners at a premium to
the risk-free rate. Homeowners will stand to make again (or loss) on their caiptal as
well as the rental from consumers. They will borrow up to the point that the cost
of borrowing is just equal to their expected return from the housing asset. Thus,
EtRh,t+1 = f
(
Nt+1
qt ht+1
)
Rt+1 (C.9.1)
where EtRh,t+1 is the rate of return on owning housing from period t to t+ 1, Nt+1
is the net worth of the household determined at the end of period t and thus carried
over into period t + 1, qt is the real price of housing in period t, f
′ < 0 and and
ht+1 is the stock of housing determined at the end of period t and carried over into
period t+ 1.
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Log-linearising
logEtRh,t+1 = log f
(
Nt+1
qt ht+1
)
+ logRt+1
Et
dRh,t+1
Rh,t+1
=
f ′(.)
f(.)
Nt+1
qt ht+1
(
dNt+1
Nt+1
−
dqt
qt
−
dht+1
ht+1
)
+
dRt+1
Rt+1
EtRˆh,t+1 = Ω(Nˆt+1 − qˆt − hˆt+1) + Rˆt+1 (C.9.2)
where φ is the steady state net worth ratio, N
qh
, and Ω = f
′(φ)
f(φ)
φ.
C.10 Ex-post gross return on housing
Homeowners will have a retun on the housing asset. Housing stock bought in period
t is rented to consumers in period t+ 1. In addition, the price of the housing stock
may change thus providing a capital gain or loss. Finally, depreciation is assumed
to erode some of the value of the exisitng housing stock.
EtRh,t+1 = Et
(
Xh,t+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
)
(C.10.1)
where qt is the real house price.
Ex-post this becomes
logRh,t = log(Xh,t + (1− δ)qt)− log qt−1
d logRh,t =
1
Xh,t + (1− δ)qt
(dXh,t + (1− δ)dqt)− d log qt−1
Defining µ = (1−δ)q
Xh+(1−δ)q
Rˆh,t = (1− µ)Xˆh,t + µqˆt − qˆt−1 (C.10.2)
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C.11 Net worth accumulation
At the end of each period, the value of homeowners is given by
Vt = Rh,tqt−1ht − f
(
Nt
qt−1ht
)
Rtbt (C.11.1)
where bt the borrowing undertaken to finance the purchase of the housing stock is
equal to qtht+1−Nt+1. After paying the dividend (Dt) to consumers, the net worth
of homeowners is given by
Nt+1 = Vt −Dt
logNt+1 = log Vt −Dt
d logNt+1 =
1
Vt −Dt
(
Vt
dVt
Vt
−Dt
dDt
Dt
)
dNt+1
Nt+1
=
1
Nt+1
(
Vt
dVt
Vt
−Dt
dDt
Dt
)
(C.11.2)
Note that C.11.1 can be simplified:
Vt = Rh,tqt−1ht − f
(
Nt
qt−1ht
)
Rtbt
= Rh,tqt−1ht − f(φt−1)Rt(qt−1ht −Nt)
= Rh,tqt−1ht − f(φt−1)Rtqt−1ht + f(φt−1)RtNt)
= Rh,tqt−1ht −Rh,tqt−1ht +Rh,tNt −Nt+1
= Rh,tNt
Hence,
dNt+1
Nt+1
=
1
Nt+1
[Rh,tNtVˆt − (Rh,tNt −Nt+1)Dˆt]
=
Rh,tNt
Nt+1
Vˆt −
Rh,tNt −Nt+1
Nt+1
Dˆt
and noting that in the steady state Nt+1 = Nt = N
Nˆt+1 = Rh Vˆt − (Rh − 1) Dˆt (C.11.3)
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Starting from the expanded definition of Vt
Vt = Rh,tqt−1ht − f(φt−1)Rtqt−1ht + f(φt−1)RtNt)
d(Rh,tqt−1ht) = Rhqh(Rˆh,t + qˆt−1 + hˆt)
d(f(φt−1)Rtqt−1ht) = Rqhf
′(φ)φ(Nˆt − qˆt−1 − hˆt) + f(φ)Rqh(Rˆt + qˆt−1 + hˆt)
d(f(φt−1)RtNt) = RNf
′(φ)φ(Nˆt − qˆt−1 − hˆt) + f(φ)RN(Nˆt + Rˆt)
Hence
dVt
V
=
dVt
RhN
=
qh
N
(Rˆh,t + qˆt−1 + hˆt)
−
qh
N
f ′(φ)
f(φ)
φ(Nˆt − qˆt−1 − hˆt)−
qh
N
(Rˆt + qˆt−1 + hˆt)
+
f ′(φ)
f(φ)
φ(Nˆt − qˆt−1 − hˆt) + Nˆt + Rˆt
= (1 + bn)Rˆh,t − bnRˆt + (1− bnΩ)Nˆt + bnΩ(qˆt−1 + hˆt)
(C.11.4)
where Ω = f
′(φ)
f(φ)
φ and bn = 1
φ
− 1.
⇒ Nˆt+1 = Rh[(1+bn)Rˆh,t−bnRˆt+(1−bnΩ)Nˆt+bnΩ(qˆt−1+hˆt)]−(Rh−1)Dˆt (C.11.5)
C.12 Housing equity withdrawal
Homeowners pay a dividend to consumers each period, the size of which is deter-
mined by the homeowner’s net worth.
Dt = χ
(
Nt+1
qtht+1
)
dDt = χ
′(.)
(
Nt+1
qtht+1
)
[Nˆt+1 − qˆt − hˆt+1]
Dˆt =
χ′(φ)
χ(φ)
φ[Nˆt+1 − qˆt − hˆt+1] (C.12.1)
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C.13 Housing capital accumulation
Given the investment above the housing stock evolves
ht+1 = ht + It − δht
dht+1 = (1− δ)dht + dIt
dht+1
ht+1
= (1− δ)
ht
ht+1
dht
ht
+
It
ht+1
dIt
It
Note in the steady state ht+1 = ht = h and It/ht+1 = I/h = δ. Thus
hˆt+1 = (1− δ)hˆt + δIˆt (C.13.1)
C.14 House prices and investment
In keeping with APV, investment and house prices are linked by a q-theory. House
producers purchase It of the consumption goods and use this to produce ht+1 units
of housing:
ht+1 = Φ
(
It
ht
)
ht
where Φ(.) is concave, giving rise to the equilibrium condition of
qt
Xc,t
= Φ′
(
It
ht
)
(C.14.1)
Log-linearising
log qt − logXc,t = log Φ
′
(
It
ht
)
d log qt − d logXc,t =
1
Φ′(.)
Φ′′
[
htdIt − Itdht
h2t
]
=
Φ′′(.)
Φ′(.)
[
It
ht
(Iˆt − hˆt)
]
qˆt = Γd(Iˆt − hˆt) + Xˆc,t
where Γd =
Φ′′(.)
Φ′(.)
(
I
h
)
(C.14.2)
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C.15 Current account
Following De Paoli (2009) by assuming that foreign households trade only foreign
currency denominated debt, then as noted in Section 2.7, the current account reduces
to
StP
f
t BF,t−1
Pt
=
StP
f
t BF,t
PtR
f
t+1ψ(.)
+ EXt −
StP
f
t
Pt
IMt (C.15.1)
d

 StP ft BF,t
PtR
f
t+1ψ(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)

 = 1
Rfψ(SP
fBF
P
)
d
(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)
+
SP fBF
P
1
Rf
[
−ψ
(
SP fBF
P
)−2
ψ′
(
SP fBF
P
)
d
(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)]
+
SP fBF
P
1
ψ
(
SP fBF
P
) [−(Rf )−2 dRft ]
= β d
(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)
− β
SP fBF
P
ψ′
(
SP fBF
P
)
ψ
(
SP fBF
P
) d
(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)
− β
SP fBF
P
dRft+1
Rft+1
Using the assumption that in the steady state the premium factor is equal to 1.
= β
[
d
(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)[
1−
SP fBF
P
ψ′
(
SP fBF
P
)]
−
SP fBF
P
dRft+1
Rft+1
]
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Defining bt =
(
StP
f
t
BF,t
Pt
−b
)
C
, a = b
C
, δb = −ψ
′(b)C ⇒ aδ = −ψ′(b)b.1
d

 StP ft BF,t
PtR
f
t+1ψ(
StP
f
t BF,t
Pt
)

 = β [btC (1 + aδb)− bRˆft+1]
= β
[
btC (1 + aδb)− aCRˆ
f
t+1
]
= βC
[
bt (1 + aδb)− aRˆ
f
t+1
]
StP
f
t BF,t−1
Pt
=
St−1P
f
t−1BF,t−1
Pt−1
St
St−1
P ft
P ft−1
Pt−1
Pt
d
(
StP
f
t BF,t−1
Pt
)
= d
(
St−1P
f
t−1BF,t−1
Pt−1
)
+
SP fBF
P
[
d
(
St
St−1
)
+ d
(
P ft
P ft−1
)
+ d
(
Pt−1
Pt
)]
= bt−1C + b[∆Sˆt + pˆi
f
t − pˆit]
d(EXt) =
(
SP f
P
)ϑ
ζ(Y f )ζ−1dY ft + (Y
f )ζϑ
(
SP f
P
)ϑ−1
d
(
StP
f
t
Pt
)
= EX

ζ dY ft
Y f
+ ϑ
d
(
StP
f
t
Pt
)
SP f
P


= EX
[
ζYˆ ft + ϑRˆSt
]
d
(
IMt
StP
f
t
Pt
)
=
SP f
P
dIMt + IMd
(
StP
f
t
Pt
)
=
SP f
P
IM

dIMt
IM
+
d
(
StP
f
t
Pt
)
SP f
P


=
SP f
P
IM
[
ˆIM t + RˆSt
]
1δb here is the cost of intermediation in the foreign bond market as discusseed in Thoenissen
(2004).
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Hence
βC
[
bt (1 + aδ)− aRˆ
f
t+1
]
= bt−1C + b[∆Sˆt + pˆi
f
t − pˆit]
− EX
[
ζYˆ ft + ϑRˆSt
]
+
SP f
P
IM
[
ˆIM t + RˆSt
]
(C.15.2)
C.16 Phillips curve
Prices are sticky in that firms get to reset their prices each period with a probability
1 − θ. For simplicity, I assume that no indexing takes place. Hence firm z that is
able to reset its price in period t will seek to optimise
L = Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kλk [p
∗
t (z)yt+k(z)− TCt+k(yt+k(z))]
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kλk
[
p∗t (z)
(
p∗t (z)
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k − TCt+k
((
p∗t (z)
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k
)]
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kλk
[
p∗t (z)
1−
(
1
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k − TCt+k
((
p∗t (z)
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k
)]
(C.16.1)
∂L
∂p∗t z
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kλk
[
(1− )p∗t (z)
1−
(
1
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k
−MCt+k(.)(−)p
∗
t (z)
−−1
(
1
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k
]
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kλk
[
(1− )
(
p∗t (z)
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k +MCt+k(.)

p∗t (z)
(
p∗t (z)
Pc,t+k
)
−
Yt+k
]
(C.16.2)
Setting to zero
0 = Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)k
1− 
p∗t (z)
λkyt+k(z)
[
p∗t (z)−

− 1
MCt+k(.)
]
(C.16.3)
p∗t (z)Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kλkyt+k(z) =

− 1
Et
∞∑
k=o
(θβ)kλkyt+k(z)MCt+k(z)
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Aggregating and differentiating with respect to P ∗c,t and λt+kYt+k
dP ∗c,tλY
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)k + PcEt
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kd(λt+kYt+k) =

− 1
MC Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kd(λt+kYt+k)
+

− 1
λY Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kdMCt+k
Dividing through by λY
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
k
dP ∗c,t + Pc
Et
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kd(λt+kYt+k)
λY
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
k
=

− 1
MC
Et
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kd(λt+kYt+k)
λY
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
k
+

− 1
Et
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kdMCt+k∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
k
Dividng through by Pc =

−1
MC
Pˆ ∗c,t +
Et
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kd(λt+kYt+k)
λY
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
k
=
Et
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kd(λt+kYt+k)
λY
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
k
+
Et
∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kdMCt+k∑
∞
k=0(θβ)
kMC
Pˆ ∗c,t = (1− θβ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kMˆCt+k
(C.16.4)
Expanding (C.16.4)
Pˆ ∗c,t = (1− θβ)Et[MˆCt + (θβ)MˆCt+1 + (θβ)
2MˆCt+2 + · · · ]
= (1− θβ)MˆCt + (1− θβ)(θβ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kMˆCt+k+1
= (1− θβ)MˆCt + (θβ)EtPˆ
∗
c,t+1
Subtracting Pˆc,t from both sides
Pˆ ∗c,t − Pˆc,t = (1− θβ)(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) + θβ[EtPˆ
∗
c,t+1 − Pˆc,t] (C.16.5)
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Define the fraction of firms whose price was set j periods ago as ωj such that
ωj = (1− θ)θ
j
Thus the current aggregate price may be written as
Pc,t =
[
∞∑
j=0
ωjp
∗
t−j(z)
1−
] 1
1−
where p∗t−j(z) is effectively the common price set by firms j periods ago.
Hence
P 1−c,t =
∞∑
j=0
ωjp
∗
t−j(z)
1−
= (1− θ)p∗t (z)
1− + (1− θ)θp∗t−1(z)
1− + (1− θ)θ2p∗t−2(z)
1− + · · ·
Thus
P 1−c,t−1 = (1− θ)p
∗
t−1(z)
1− + (1− θ)θp∗t−2(z)
1− + (1− θ)θ2p∗t−3(z)
1− + · · ·
P 1−c,t = (1− θ)p
∗
t (z)
1− + θP 1−c,t−1
Pc,t =
[
(1− θ)p∗t (z)
1− + θP 1−c,t−1
] 1
1−
logPc,t =
1
1− 
log
[
(1− θ)p∗t (z)
1− + θP 1−c,t−1
]
dPc,t
Pc,t
=
1
1− 
1
P 1−c,t
{
(1− θ)(1− )p∗t (z)
1−dp
∗
t (z)
p∗t (z)
+ θ(1− )P 1−c,t−1
dPc,t−1
Pc,t−1
}
Noting that in the steady state Pc = p
∗(z) and that p∗t (z) is equivalent to the
aggregate P ∗c,t
Pˆc,t = (1− θ)Pˆ
∗
c,t + θPˆc,t−1
⇒ Pˆ ∗c,t =
Pˆc,t
1− θ
−
θ
1− θ
Pˆc,t−1 (C.16.6)
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Subtracting Pˆc,t from (C.16.6)
Pˆ ∗c,t − Pˆc,t =
1
1− θ
Pˆc,t −
θ
1− θ
Pˆc,t−1 − Pˆc,t
Which is also equal to (C.16.5)
1
1− θ
Pˆc,t −
θ
1− θ
Pˆc,t−1 − Pˆc,t = (1− θβ)(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) + θβ[EtPˆ
∗
c,t+1 − Pˆc,t]
= (1− θβ)(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) + θβ[Et
1
1− θ
Pˆc,t+1 −
θ
1− θ
Pˆc,t − Pˆc,t]
1− 1 + θ
1− θ
Pˆc,t −
θ
1− θ
Pˆc,t−1 = (1− θβ)(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) +
θβ
1− θ
[EtPˆc,t+1 − θPˆc,t − (1− θ)Pˆc,t]
θ
1− θ
(Pˆc,t − Pˆc,t−1) = (1− θβ)(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) +
θβ
1− θ
[EtPˆc,t+1 − Pˆc,t]
Pˆc,t − Pˆc,t−1 =
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) + β[EtPˆc,t+1 − Pˆc,t]
pˆic,t =
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
(MˆCt − Pˆc,t) + βEtpˆic,t+1
(C.16.7)
Note here that MˆCt is nominal marginal cost and thus mˆct = MˆCt − Pˆc,t.
C.16.1 Flexible price output
Yˆ flext =
−α
(
IM
Y
)γ
(1− γ)
[
(1− α)
(
AL
Y
)γ
−
(
1−γ
1−γ+τ
)]RˆSt + (1− α)
(
1+τ
1−γ+τ
) (
AL
Y
)γ
(1− α)
(
AL
Y
)γ
− 1−γ
1−γ+τ
Aˆt
(C.16.8)
It should be noted that the design of the denominator in the coefficient on the
technology shock is not unambiguously positive. Given assumed values for L of 0.33
and α of 0.2, I found that a γ value of -0.2 ensures the coefficient is positive while
a γ value of -0.3 results in a negative coefficient.
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C.17 Real exchange rate identity
RSt =
StP
f
t
Pt
EtRSt+1
RSt
=
Et
(
St+1P
f
t+1
Pt+1
)
StP
f
t
Pt
= Et
St+1
St
pift+1
pit+1
EtRˆSt+1 − RˆSt = EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt + Etpˆi
f
t+1 − Etpˆit+1
= EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt + Etpˆi
f
t+1 − Etpˆic,t+1 + (EtXˆc,t+1 − Xˆc,t) (C.17.1)
C.18 Nominal interest rate identity
Rnt+1 = Rt+1
EtPt+1
Pt
Define
pit = Pt/Pt−1
Hence,
pit ×
Pc,t−1
Pc,t
=
Xc,t−1
Xc,t
pit
pic,t
=
Xc,t−1
Xc,t
pˆit − pˆic,t = Xˆc,t−1 − Xˆc,t (C.18.1)
logRnt+1 = logRt+1 + logEtpit+1
Rˆnt+1 = Rˆt+1 + Etpˆic,t+1 − (EtXˆc,t+1 − Xˆc,t) (C.18.2)
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Appendix D
Derivation of log-linear equations:
Fiscal model
D.1 Rule of thumb consumption
Rule of thumb consumers do not income smooth and consume all their income each
period.
Crt = wtL
r
t − (1− n)Tt
dCrt = wtdL
r
t + Ltdwt − (1− n)dTt
Cˆrt =
wLr
Cr
[Lˆrt + wˆt]−
(1− n)T
Cr
Tˆt (D.1.1)
Combining the definition of ROT consumption with the first order conditions for
consumption and labour supply yields
wtL
r
t − (1− n)Tt =
wt(1− L
r
t )
ξ
⇒ wtL
r
t
(
1 +
1
ξ
)
=
wt
ξ
+ (1− n)Tt
⇒ Lrt =
1
1 + ξ
+
ξ
wt
(1− n)Tt (D.1.2)
D.2 Government
For simplicity government expenditure does not impact households directly (typi-
cally done in the form of a transfer) but is rather a source of demand for producers
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(and thence labour demand). Following Gal´ı, Valle´s and Lo´pez-Salido (2007), fiscal
policy is modelled as the combination of (all in real terms) exogenous government
spending (Gt), government debt (B
G
t ) and lump-sum taxes (Tt).
R−1t+1B
G
t+1 represents the quantum of funds borrowed in period t with B
G
t+1 repaid in
period t+ 1. Hence the government budget constraint can be written:
Tt +R
−1
t+1B
G
t+1 = B
G
t +Gt
dTt +
RdBGt+1 − B
G dRt+1
R2
= dGt + dB
G
Given that in the steady state T +B = B +G⇔ T = G and in addition assuming
a steady state of BG = 0
G
Y
dTt
T
+
1
R
(
dBGt+1
Y
−
BG
Y
dRt+1
R
)
=
dBGt
Y
+
G
Y
dGt
G
dBGt+1
Y
= R
[
dBGt
Y
+
G
Y
(Gˆt − Tˆt)
]
(D.2.1)
The fiscal rule determines how expenditure is funded, initially as a rule for lump-sum
taxes and consequently how much new debt is issued.
Tt − T
T
T
Y
= φB
BGt
Y
+ φG
Gt −G
G
G
Y
Tˆt =
(
G
Y
)
−1
φB
BGt
Y
+ φGGˆt (D.2.2)
Government expenditure on good z is given by
Gt(z) =
(
pt(z)
Pc,t
)
−
Gt
D.3 Resource constraint
Output from firms is consumed by domestic consumers, government and foreign
consumers or utilised in the production of housing:
Yt = ct + It +Gt + EXt
Yˆt =
c
Y
cˆt +
I
Y
Iˆt +
G
Y
Gˆt +
EX
Y
EˆX t (D.3.1)
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where ct is domestic consumption of consumption goods, It is investment in housing,
Gt is government purchases of conumption goods and EXt is consumption goods
exported to foreign consumers.
D.4 Current account
Assuming that domestic debt issued by PIH consumers and government debt are
perfect subsititutes and are in net zero supply means that the inclusion of gov-
ernemnt debt in the fiscal model leaves the log-linearised current account equation
the same as the basic model, i.e.
βC
[
bt (1 + aδ)− aRˆ
f
t+1
]
= bt−1C + b[∆Sˆt + pˆi
f
t − pˆit]
− EX
[
ζYˆ ft + ϑRˆSt
]
+
SP f
P
IM
[
ˆIM t + RˆSt
]
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Appendix E
Derivation of the steady state
equations
E.1 Ex-ante return on housing
EtRh,t+1 = f
(
Nt+1
qt ht+1
)
Rt+1
⇒ Rh = f
(
N
qh
)
R (E.1.1)
E.2 Relative price of rental
EtRh,t+1 = Et
(
Xh,t+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
)
⇒ Rh =
(
Xh
q
)
+ (1− δ)
⇒ Xh = [Rh − (1− δ)]q (E.2.1)
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E.3 Relative price of consumption goods
Pt = [υP
1−η
c,t + (1− υ)P
1−η
h,t ]
1
1−η
1 = [υX1−ηc,t + (1− υ)X
1−η
h,t ]
1
1−η
1 = [υX1−ηc + (1− υ)X
1−η
h ]
1
1−η (E.3.1)
E.4 Dividend
Nt+1 = Vt −Dt
= Rh,tqt−1ht − f
(
Nt
qt−1ht
)
Rtbt −Dt
⇒ N = Rhqh− f
(
N
qh
)
R(qh−N)−D
= RhN −D
N(1−Rh) = −D
D = N(Rh − 1) (E.4.1)
E.5 Aggregate consumption
ht = (1− υ)
(
Ph,t
Pt
)
−η
Ct
= (1− υ)X−ηh C
⇒ C =
h
(1− υ)X−ηh
(E.5.1)
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E.6 Household consumption of goods
ct = υ
(
Pc,t
Pt
)
−η
Ct
⇒ c = υX−ηc C (E.6.1)
E.7 Investment
ht+1 = ht + It − δht
⇒ I = δh (E.7.1)
E.8 Resource constraint
Yt = ct + It + EXt
⇒Y = c+ I +
EX
Y
Y
Y
(
1−
EX
Y
)
= c+ I
Y =
c+ I
1− EX
Y
(E.8.1)
E.9 Aggregate labour
Yt(z) = [αIMt(z)
γ + (1− α)(AtLt(z))
γ]
1
γ
⇒ L =
(
Y γ − IMγ
1− α
) 1
γ
(E.9.1)
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E.10 Goods producers first order conditions
(
IMt
Lt
)1−γ
=
α
1− α
wt
RSt
⇒
(
IM
L
)1−γ
=
α
1− α
w
RS
(E.10.1)
E.11 Wage rate
1
Ct
=
ξ
wt(1− Lt)
⇒ w =
Cξ
(1− L)
(E.11.1)
E.12 Rule of thumb labour supply
wLr =
w
ξ
(1− Lr)
⇒ Lr =
1
ξ
−
Lr
ξ
⇒ Lr
(
1 + ξ
ξ
)
=
1
ξ
⇒ Lr =
1
1 + ξ
(E.12.1)
E.13 Permanent income hypothesis labour supply
Lt = nL
p
t + (1− n)L
r
t
⇒ Lp =
L− (1− n)Lr
n
(E.13.1)
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E.14 Rule of thumb consumption
Crt = wtL
r
t
→ Cr = wLr (E.14.1)
E.15 Permanent income hypothesis consumption
Ct = nC
p
t + (1− n)C
r
t
⇒ Cp =
C − (1− n)Cr
n
(E.15.1)
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Appendix F
Derivation of the steady state
equations: fiscal model
F.1 Resource constraint
Yt = ct + It +Gt + EXt
⇒Y = c+ I +
G
Y
Y +
EX
Y
Y
Y
(
1−
G
Y
−
EX
Y
)
= c+ I
Y =
c+ I
1− G
Y
− EX
Y
(F.1.1)
F.2 Rule of thumb labour supply
From equation (D.1.2) it follows that
Lr =
1
1 + ξ
+
ξ
w
(1− n)T (F.2.1)
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